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Summary 
In 2015, media reported on new allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by UN peacekeepers against civilians. This was not the first time 
such allegations were made. Although a number of measures have been taken 
at the UN level to combat these crimes, the problem persists.  
 
The majority of the personnel in UN peacekeeping operations are members of 
national military contingents, and most of the allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse are directed against this group. Regarding these persons, criminal 
jurisdiction and authority to decide on disciplinary matters stay with the 
sending State. The sending State is therefore responsible for investigating and 
prosecuting crimes committed by members of their national contingents but 
for different reasons, domestic authorities do not always investigate into such 
allegations. This essay focuses on the responsibility of the sending State. The 
scope of human rights treaties – the ICCPR to some extent but mainly the 
ECHR – is examined in this regard. The rationale behind this focus is that the 
ECHR is arguably the human rights instrument with the largest potential of 
providing a successful legal venue for the individual in this respect. 
Additionally, the judgments of the ECtHR, unlike the decisions of the HRC, 
are legally binding. As most UN peacekeeping operations take place in other 
continents than Europe, the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction is central 
and a prerequisite for holding the sending State accountable for human rights 
violations committed by its soldiers in this context.  
 
There is no doubt that the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been 
acknowledged both in terms of the ICCPR and the ECHR. Regarding the 
latter, the ECtHR has in recent years shown a more permissive approach to the 
notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction and its case law has evolved significantly 
in this regard. However, in a case concerning a UN operation in Kosovo, 
where the conduct in question was considered attributable to the UN rather 
than to the sending State, the case was declared inadmissible. It was held that 
acts of Contracting Parties covered by a UNSC resolution could not be 
subjected to the scrutiny of the ECtHR. In this essay it is assumed that acts of 
sexual exploitation and abuse cannot be covered by the mandate or be 
attributable to the UN. The ECtHR is thus able to review such cases. It is 
argued that extraterritorial jurisdiction can arise in two ways; through a 
continuously permissive interpretation and application of the concept of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by the ECtHR, or through the application of a 
model of extraterritorial jurisdiction argued for in the legal doctrine, which 
separates between positive and negative human rights obligations of States. 
 
However, State responsibility under the ECHR is not enough from the 
perspective of the victims. UN peacekeepers come from all over the world, 
and the largest troop-contributing nations are not parties to the ECHR. Thus, 
there is a need for a global solution in order for the victims of these violations 
to be able to seek justice and redress and in order to address impunity. A 
convention-based regime or a special court or tribunal for this purpose is 
therefore suggested as a possible solution. 
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Sammanfattning 
Under 2015 riktades nya anklagelser mot personal i FN:s fredsbevarande 
insatser om sexuella övergrepp mot civila. Detta var långt ifrån första gången 
sådana anklagelser riktades mot FN-personal. Trots att mängder av åtgärder 
har vidtagits inom FN-systemet för att motarbeta detta, kvarstår problemet. 
 
Majoriteten av personalen i FN-insatser tillhör nationella kontingenter, och det 
är också mot dessa som de flesta av anklagelserna om övergrepp har riktats. I 
förhållande till denna personalkategori behåller sändarstaten straffrättslig 
jurisdiktion och rätten att vidta disciplinära åtgärder. Ansvaret för att utreda 
och åtala brott som begås av denna grupp vilar alltså på sändarstaten. Av olika 
anledningar tar truppbidragande stater inte alltid detta ansvar. I denna uppsats 
ligger fokus därför på staters ansvar under olika MR-traktat – till viss del 
ICCPR men med huvudsakligt fokus på EKMR – där dessa brott begås av 
deras utsända personal. Anledningen till detta fokus är att EKMR kan antas 
vara det MR-instrument som ger individen störst möjlighet att söka upprättelse 
och rättvisa. Därtill är Europadomstolens domar till skillnad från exempelvis 
FN:s kommitté för mänskliga rättigheters (MR-kommitténs) beslut rättsligt 
bindande. Då i princip alla FN:s fredsbevarande insatser äger rum på andra 
kontinenter än Europa, är frågan om extraterritoriell jurisdiktion av central 
betydelse, eftersom statens utövande av jurisdiktion är en förutsättning för att 
kunna hålla sändarstaten ansvarig för MR-kränkningar som begås av dess 
soldater i det här sammanhanget. 
 
Det råder inget tvivel om att extraterritoriell jurisdiktion är ett erkänt koncept i 
förhållande till såväl ICCPR som EKMR. Vad gäller den senare har 
Europadomstolen på senare år tillämpat en allt mer generös tolkning av 
begreppet extraterritoriell jurisdiktion och har utvecklat praxis avsevärt i detta 
avseende. I ett fall som rörde FN-närvaro i Kosovo och där gärningarna (eller 
underlåtelserna) i fråga ansågs vara hänförliga till FN som organisation snarare 
än till sändarstaten förklarade dock Europadomstolen klagomålen icke-
admissibla. Man uttalade att gärningar utförda av sändarstaten täckta av en 
säkerhetsrådsresolution inte kunde granskas av Europadomstolen. I denna 
uppsats förutsätts att sexuella övergrepp aldrig kan täckas av mandatet och 
aldrig vara hänförliga till FN, utan att Europadomstolen kan granska sådana 
fall och att stater därmed kan hållas ansvariga. Två möjliga sätt för 
extraterritoriell jurisdiktion att uppstå på i dessa fall presenteras; genom en 
fortsatt generös tolkning och tillämpning av begreppet extraterritoriell 
jurisdiktion av Europadomstolen, eller genom tillämpning av en modell för 
extraterritoriell jurisdiktion som har förts fram i litteraturen som skiljer mellan 
staters positiva och negativa MR-skyldigheter. 
 
Ur offrens perspektiv är dock staters möjliga ansvar under EKMR otillräckligt. 
FN-soldater kommer från alla världens hörn, och de största truppbidragande 
länderna är inte statsparter till EKMR. Därför behövs en global lösning för att 
komma tillrätta med den straffrihet som ofta råder för dessa brott och för att 
offren ska kunna få upprättelse. Ett konventionsbaserat system eller en särskild 
domstol eller tribunal för dessa frågor föreslås därför som en tänkbar lösning. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and purpose 
According to Article 1.1 of the UN Charter, one of the purposes of the 
organisation is to maintain international peace and security. In pursuit of this 
aim, the Security Council has established many peacekeeping operations.  
 
Article 1.3 of the UN Charter provides that another purpose of the 
organisation is to achieve international cooperation in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. UN 
peacekeepers are deployed with, inter alia, the purpose to protect the civilian 
population. However, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and other 
human rights violations committed by military as well as civil personnel against 
the civilian population in the course of UN peacekeeping operations have been 
reported every now and then. For example, allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse have been reported in relation to UN operations in Mali1, Haiti2 and 
the Central African Republic (CAR)3. Such acts may violate human rights of 
individuals, such as the rights not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment as laid down in, inter alia, the ICCPR and, where European 
States are concerned, the ECHR.  
 
What is even more discouraging is that it is not a new phenomenon. The 
problem has been documented by media and human rights organisations since 
the early 1990s4, and as a reaction, numerous measures have been taken within 
the UN system. In 2005, the so-called Zeid Report5 produced by Prince Zeid 
Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan (current UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights) was released. The Zeid Report was a comprehensive analysis and 
report on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel and 
contained a number of concrete recommendations on this matter. However, 
ten years later, several reports reveal that the problem persists, most recently 
allegedly in the Central African Republic.6 The occurrence of sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeepers is, arguably, all the 
more disturbing in light of the discourse relating to the UN Security Council 
resolution 13257 and subsequent resolutions forming the framework for the 
women, peace and security agenda. These resolutions, inter alia, acknowledge the 
different experiences of armed conflict experienced by women and men, and 
                                                
1 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45942#.VZpufBPtmko (acquired 10 
2 UN peacekeepers sexually abuse hundreds of women and minors in Haiti in exchange for food and medicine, 
new report will reveal, The Independent (2015). 
3 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/peacekeepers-face-sex-abuse-claims-car-
150624123505253.html (acquired 10 October 2015). 
4 Murphy (2008), p. 75. See also Global Policy Forum (2005).  
5 Report of the Secretary-General, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”, UN Doc. A/59/10, 24 March 2005; 
commonly referred to as the Zeid Report. 
6 See e.g. UN aid worker suspended for leaking report on child abuse by French troops, The Guardian 
(2015).  
7 S/RES/1325 (2000), 31 October 2000. 
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reaffirm the important role of women in prevention and resolution of 
conflicts, and calls on parties to conflicts to protect women and girls from 
gender-based violence such as rape and other forms of sexual abuse. As 
women and girls are subjected to sexual exploitation and abuse more 
frequently than men, combatting the occurrence of such acts in the course of 
UN peacekeeping ought to be a priority in light of the women, peace and security 
agenda. In October 2015, Security Council resolution 22428 was adopted, inter 
alia, urging police- and troop-contributing nations to provide robust pre-
deployment training on sexual exploitation and abuse, to conduct swift and 
thorough investigations of their uniformed personnel, and, if appropriate, to 
prosecute such crimes. 
 
UN peacekeepers come from all over the world and different legal regimes 
apply to different categories of personnel in a peacekeeping operation. Where 
members of military contingents in UN peacekeeping operations are 
concerned, the troop-contributing nation retains jurisdiction in criminal and 
disciplinary matters.9 The host State is often a wrecked State in lack of a 
functioning legal system, and prosecution in that State is not possible, while at 
the same time the troop-contributing nations are sometimes unwilling or 
unable to prosecute. It is not clear to what extent a troop-contributing nation 
can be held responsible under different human rights treaties for acts 
committed by their representatives in the context of UN peacekeeping 
operations. In recent years, a general trend can be distinguished among 
international human rights law bodies, especially the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), towards a more permissive approach to 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. In the Behrami and 
Saramati10 admissibility decision of 2008, however, the ECtHR basically 
declared itself incompetent to review acts covered by UN Security Council 
resolutions carried out by national contingents during peacekeeping operations 
because doing so would interfere with the fulfilment of the UN’s key mission 
in this field, including with the effective conduct of its operations.11  
 
Impunity and the lack of accountability for human rights violations in the 
course of UN peacekeeping operations is a huge problem as it not only 
severely hampers the possibility of the victims to seek redress, but it is also 
damaging the credibility of the UN as such. The purpose of this essay is to 
explore and analyse how different international law bodies have dealt with 
accountability for such acts and to suggest different ways of addressing 
impunity in order to combat the persistence of the problem.  
1.2 Research questions and delimitations 
This essay focuses on the situation where military members of national 
contingents commit rape or other acts of sexual exploitation or abuse against 
the civilian population, and the allocation of responsibility in such situations. 
                                                
8 S/RES/2242 (2015), 13 October 2015. 
9 See Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations, para. 47 (b). 
10Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, appl. nos. 71412/01 
and 78166/01, Admissibility Decision of 2 May 2007. 
11 Ibid., para. 149. 
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The criminal responsibility of the individual perpetrators is not the main focus 
of this study; rather, the possibility of holding the sending State accountable 
for acts committed by their representatives under human rights law is explored. 
Since these acts practically exclusively take place outside of the territory of the 
troop-contributing nations, it is examined how and to what extent different 
international human rights bodies, particularly the European Court of Human 
Rights and to some extent the Human Rights Committee (HRC), have dealt 
with the issue of extraterritorial application of their respective human rights 
treaties in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. In doing so, it is further 
examined whether a satisfactory human rights protection is afforded to 
civilians in these areas and a de lege ferenda reasoning is carried out in order to 
suggest a way forward to addressing impunity. Several questions are addressed. 
A key question is:  
 
• When can a sending State be held accountable for human rights 
violations committed by its soldiers during UN peacekeeping 
operations under relevant human rights treaties?  
 
In answering this question, I have chosen to focus on the ECHR (and thus the 
responsibility of European troop-contributing nations) and, to some extent, 
the ICCPR. The main reasons for this selection is, firstly, that based on my 
previous knowledge, I estimate that the ECHR is the human rights instrument 
with the largest potential of providing a successful legal venue in this respect, 
and secondly, time and space limitations. An obvious strength of the ECtHR 
in this respect and another reason why it is focused upon is that its judgments 
are legally binding for Contracting States. In order to answer the above-
mentioned question, the following question must also be addressed: 
  
• When can sending States exercise jurisdiction in the meaning of article 
1 ECHR and/or article 2.1 ICCPR in the context of a UN 
peacekeeping operation? 
 
In this connection, the questions of attribution of conduct and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction are crucial. After establishing the above-mentioned, the specific 
situation of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by, inter alia, French UN 
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic is addressed in order to 
concretise the problems that arise. It is not claimed that the problem is more 
prevalent in some contexts than in others or that some countries are worse 
than others, but the example has been chosen to show that the problem is real, 
that such abuse has occurred and that it might occur again in the future if the 
issue is not properly addressed. Misconduct has been reported in relation to 
peacekeepers from many countries, not only France, which has been in the 
centre of attention of media recently. However, using an example involving a 
European State raises the question of the applicability of the ECHR. A de lege 
ferenda reasoning is carried out in chapter 4, addressing the following question:  
 
• Can victims of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Central African 
Republic bring a legal claim against the (European) sending State 
before the European Court of Human Rights? 
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Further, in order for this study not to become unreasonably large in its scope, a 
number of delimitations have been made. Focus is placed upon the procedural 
aspects of relevant human rights treaties and the possibilities of bringing a legal 
claim against the sending State, rather than the scope and content of the 
substantial rights. The human rights obligations of the host State are not dealt 
with, nor individual responsibility under international criminal law. As 
explained above, the main focus is placed upon the ECHR and, to some 
extent, the ICCPR. The role of other conventions and bodies, such as the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and its Committee is not being examined. Another 
question that lies near the focus of this essay but in which it is not engaged is 
the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
As mentioned above, the focus of this essay is the responsibility for acts 
committed by military members of national contingents. The rationale behind 
this choice is that military personnel constitute the majority of the total 
personnel in peacekeeping operations and the majority of the reported 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are directed against military 
personnel.12 Acts by UN officials and so-called experts on mission are not dealt 
with as they are ruled by different legal regimes. Lastly, it is presumed 
throughout this essay that sexual exploitation and abuse can never be covered 
by a UN peacekeeping operation mandate. 
1.3 Theory, methodology and material 
A starting point of this essay is the presumption that human rights are 
universal and should be enjoyed equally by all individuals. The universality of 
human rights is stated in, inter alia, Article 55 and Article 56 of the UN Charter, 
in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Through the ratification of 
international human rights treaties, States commit to secure to its citizens the 
rights and freedoms in the treaty concerned. Sometimes that obligation may be 
extended to other individuals than its citizens through for example 
extraterritorial application of the human rights treaty. Where the human rights 
of an individual have been violated, that individual should have access to 
justice and measures should be taken to address impunity and to ensure that 
perpetrators are held to account. As outlined above, in the context of UN 
peacekeeping operations, the host State is often unable to investigate and 
prosecute due to the lack of a functioning legal system, which is part of the 
reason why the peacekeeping operation is there in the first place. Irrespective 
of this and regardless of the form of organisation of the entity to which the 
perpetrators belong, the issue of accountability needs to be addressed. In light 
of this, it is my opinion that in situations where States act extraterritorially, 
including where peacekeeping troops are deployed by the UN in order to 
protect civilians, the existing human rights treaties do not offer a satisfactory 
human rights protection for individuals. On the basis of this point of 
departure, the question of how troop-contributing nations could be held 
                                                
12 See e.g. Zeid Report, para. 9, p. 9; in 2004, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
received 16 allegations against civilians, 9 against civilian police and 80 against military 
personnel. See also Wills (2013), p. 48. 
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accountable for human rights violations committed by its soldiers is examined, 
using the legal dogmatic methodology. When applied correctly, this 
methodology can be used to put forward critique against the law and propose 
reforms.13 This essay aims to do so, and for such proposals to contain ways to 
address the issue of impunity and provide possibilities for individuals to seek 
redress. 
 
This essay is structured as follows. Chapter 2 consists of a description of the 
legal framework that regulates UN peacekeeping and measures that have been 
taken to combat the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse in the course 
of UN peacekeeping. Chapter 3 contains a presentation of jurisdiction and the 
notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, as well as attribution of conduct, which 
are all of significance for the purpose of this essay. The main analysis is carried 
out in chapter 4 while chapter 5 contains some concluding remarks. Each of 
the main chapters starts with a describing part but also contains a concluding 
section with my reflections and analysis. In these sections, an attempt is made 
to sum up what has been outlined in the chapter in order to provide a good 
basis for analysis and some of these sections contain analyses and reasoning in 
relation to the research questions posed in this chapter. The research questions 
and the material used are discussed and the relevant sources of law are applied 
to the problem in order to find a feasible answer. The current state of affairs in 
general, and the case law of the ECtHR in particular (and, to some extent, that 
of the Human Rights Committee), are discussed and criticised to some extent.  
 
In doing this, a traditional legal methodology, a legal dogmatic methodology, is 
used. The purpose of such method is often described as reconstructing the 
solution of a legal problem, often posed as a concrete research question, by 
applying a rule to it. The basis of doing so is the principles of the commonly 
accepted sources of law according to the hierarchy of norms. In international 
law, according to Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, the recognised sources of law are treaties and conventions, 
international custom, general principles of law, and subsidiary sources such as 
judicial decisions and legal teachings.14 A legal dogmatic analysis intends to 
analyse the relevant sources of law so that the result can be assumed to reflect 
the established law, or how the relevant rule should be perceived in a given 
context.15 The describing sections of this essay mainly consist of a description 
de lege lata, focusing on how the law has been applied this far by international 
human rights law bodies. The “reflection sections” and the main analysis 
carried out in chapter 4 consist mainly of argumentation de lege ferenda and it is 
argued for a different approach to the legal questions at issue, and proposed 
approaches to matters yet unresolved are put forward.  
 
The international law treaties that have been studied for the purpose of this 
essay are mainly the UN Charter, the ECHR and the ICCPR. In addition to 
this, case law from different international law bodies have also been examined; 
mainly from the ICJ, the ECtHR and the HRC. Focus is placed upon 
judgments relating to extraterritorial application of the treaties and, in the 
                                                
13 See Kleineman (2013), p. 24. 
14 See also Evans (2014), p. 91. 
15 See Kleineman (2013), p. 26. 
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context of the ECHR, particularly concerning acts committed by the armed 
forces of a State abroad. In terms of literature, mostly renowned publishers 
and journals have been used but attempt has been made to acquire information 
from a wide variety of sources. In addition to this, relevant UN documents 
have been studied, ranging from Security Council resolutions to handbooks for 
peacekeeping. 
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2 United Nations peacekeeping 
operations and human rights 
violations by peacekeepers 
2.1 Legal framework of UN peacekeeping 
operations 
UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to create conditions for lasting 
peace in countries torn by conflict and the operations consist of military, police 
and civilian personnel from all over the world.16 Different rules apply to 
different categories of personnel. The multidimensional and multinational 
nature of the operations implies that the allocation of responsibility in the case 
of human rights violations by peacekeeping personnel is complex. This chapter 
aims to clarify the legal framework regulating UN peacekeeping operations in 
order to enable a subsequent analysis.   
2.1.1 General rules regulating UN peacekeeping 
operations 
Most peacekeeping missions constitute subsidiary organs to the UN Security 
Council.17 As subsidiary organs, the privileges and immunities established in 
Article 105 of the UN Charter apply to the operations.18 In addition to the 
resolution establishing the operation in question, the legal framework of the 
peacekeeping operation basically consists of a status-of-forces agreement 
(SOFA) between the UN and the host State, a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) between the UN and troop-contributing nations, and Force 
Regulations issued by the Secretary-General.19 Further, there are Rules of 
Engagement of each mission, tailored to the specific mandate of the mission as 
well as the situation on the ground, defining the use of force allowed by 
members of peacekeeping contingents.20 The detailed provisions of these 
documents are not in focus in this essay. 
 
Regarding military personnel contributed by States to the operation, the model 
memorandum of understanding between the UN and the troop-contributing 
State (which applies where no specific MOU has been concluded or until it is 
concluded) prescribes that the sending State consents to place its national 
contingent, while remaining in their national service, under UN command.21 
This structure is to give the Secretary-General full authority over deployment, 
                                                
16 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/ (acquired 10 December 2015. 
17 See http://www.un.org/en/sc/subsidiary/ (acquired 11 October 2015). 
18 Murphy (2008), p. 77. 
19 Ibid., p. 77. 
20 Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, p. 140. 
21 Model agreement between the United Nations and Member States contributing personnel 
and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations, Article V(7). 
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organisation, conduct and direction of the peacekeeping operation.22 This 
enables the UN to incorporate the contingents into its organisational 
structure.23 However, as outlined in chapter 1.1, certain crucial competences 
such as criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary matters stay with the sending 
States, and some legal and institutional relationships between the national 
contingents and their sending State is thus retained.24 National contingents 
keep their character as organs of their respective sending State, also where the 
international operation in question constitutes a subsidiary organ of an 
international organisation, for example UN peacekeeping operations.25 This 
circumstance is of importance to the rest of this essay as the issue of 
accountability of military members of national contingents and the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the sending States are addressed. 
2.1.2 The relationship between UN Security Council 
resolutions and other international agreements 
As outlined above, the legal bases of most UN peacekeeping operations are 
UN Security Council resolutions containing the mandate for the operation in 
question. In the following (chapter 4), the possibility of applying human rights 
treaties, particularly the ECHR, extraterritorially in the context of UN 
peacekeeping operations is examined. Such application could to some extent 
address the issue of accountability by holding sending States responsible for 
human rights violations committed by its soldiers. However, if the UN Security 
Council resolution in question provides anything counter to the human rights 
treaty in question, there might be a norm conflict. Therefore, establishing the 
relationship between international agreements, i.e. human rights treaties, and 
norms contained in the UN Charter or provisions in UN Security Council 
resolutions is of relevance.  
 
Article 103 of the UN Charter states that: 
 
”In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.” 
 
This has been interpreted as covering not only obligations arising directly from 
the UN Charter itself, but also those included in binding decisions by UN 
Charter bodies, such as Security Council resolutions.26 Article 103 of the UN 
Charter implies that Charter obligations prevail over other international treaty 
obligations, regardless of whether the other international treaty was concluded 
                                                
22 Model agreement between the United Nations and Member States contributing personnel 
and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations, Article V(7). 
23 Sari (2008), p. 159–160. 
24 Ibid., p. 159–160. 
25 Ibid., p. 159. 
26 Fragmentation of international law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of 
international law, pp. 168–169, para. 331. 
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before or after the UN Charter, or if it was a regional treaty.27 Article 25 of the 
UN Charter also holds that UN Member States “[…] agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter”. This suggests that obligations arising from for example Security 
Council resolutions prevail over obligations arising from any other 
international agreements. Further, according to the ICJ, Article 25 of the UN 
Charter means that also obligations stemming from Security Council 
resolutions prevail over obligations arising from any other international 
agreement.28 Hence, in case of norm conflict with for example the ECHR, 
obligations arising from a Security Council resolution should prevail.  
 
This entails that certain conduct otherwise prohibited under human rights law 
might be lawful in the context of a Security Council-mandated operation. 
When acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council often 
refers to the use of “all necessary means” when authorising use of force. An 
important issue is what acts are allowed according to the mandate, or in other 
words, what means are necessary under what circumstances. It can be argued 
that resort to violence to some extent, for example in the exercise of self-
defence, must be allowed in pursuit of carrying out the mandate. However, 
that will not be elaborated further as this essay primarily deals with the 
possibilities of bringing a claim towards the troop-contributing nation for acts 
of sexual violence committed by its soldiers. As outlined in chapter 1.2, it is 
presumed that sexual exploitation and abuse cannot be covered by a UN 
mandate.   
 
In the context of EU law, the relationship between Security Council 
resolutions and the then European Community Treaty was subject to the 
scrutiny of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the joint Kadi and Al 
Barakaat29 cases. The case concerned several UN Security Council resolutions, 
which imposed on UN Member States to take measures to freeze financial 
assets of persons and organisations associated with Osama bin Laden, al-
Qaeda or the Taleban, and the European Community regulations enforcing 
them. The applicants were on the list of persons set up by the Sanctions 
Committee of the Security Council whose assets were to be frozen. According 
to the applicants, these measures violated their rights protected by the 
European Community Treaty, namely the right to a fair trial and to respect for 
their property. Thus, the case concerned whether Security Council resolutions 
should prevail over EU law and norms protecting human rights contained 
therein. Before the Court of First Instance, the applicants’ claims were rejected 
because Article 103 of the UN Charter was considered to give primacy to 
                                                
27 See Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, para. 27; 
reference is also made there to Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 26 November 
1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392, para. 107. 
28 See Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, para. 27; 
reference is also made there to, inter alia, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United 
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 114, 
para. 42.  
29 Judgment Kadi and Al Barakaat, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461. 
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Security Council resolutions before other international obligations, including 
the EC Treaty. The Court of First Instance therefore did not have the 
authority to review Security Council resolutions or call in question their 
lawfulness in the light of Community law.30 As is shown below (chapter 3.4), 
the ECtHR came to a similar conclusion in the Behrami and Saramati case 
regarding the relationship between the ECHR and decisions by the UN 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
The ECJ was, however, of another view on this matter.  According to the ECJ, 
EC (EU) law formed an internal and autonomous legal order and the 
lawfulness of a Community regulation within that legal order could be 
reviewed  in the light of fundamental rights by the ECJ, even though the 
regulation had been adopted as a consequence of UN Security Council 
measures.31 The ECJ held that it is not for the European Community 
judicature to review the lawfulness as such of a resolution adopted by an 
international body, but rather to review the lawfulness of the implementing 
measure.32 Further, it stated that “[…]the obligations imposed by an 
international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional 
principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all Community 
acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of 
their lawfulness which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the 
complete system of legal remedies established by the Treaty”.33 Thereafter, the 
ECJ found that the restrictive measures contained in the regulation in question 
constituted an unjustified restriction of the right to property as there was no 
guarantee enabling the person or entity to put his or her case before the 
competent authorities in a situation, “[…]in which the restriction of his 
property rights must be regarded as significant”.34 The implementing measures 
were annulled.  
 
The Kadi and Al Barakaat judgment was followed by extensive debate and has 
been subject to rather heavy criticism. By describing EU law as a distinct legal 
order, separate from that of international law, the ECJ took a dualist approach, 
which has been described as “[…] unfaithful to its traditional fidelity to public 
international law”.35 The approach of the ECJ allegedly risked sending the 
wrong message to for example domestic courts and organisations 
contemplating the enforcement of Security Council resolutions.36 Further, it 
was argued by some observers that the said approach also risked undermining 
the “[…] image the EU has sought to create for itself as a virtuous 
international actor maintaining a distinctive commitment to international law 
                                                
30 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council 
of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, T-315/01, 
ECLI:EU:T:2005:332, para. 225; and Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 
2005, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, T-306/01, ECLI:EU:T:2005:331, para. 276. 
31 Kadi and Al Barakaat, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paras. 317 and 326. 
32 Ibid., para. 286. 
33 Ibid., para. 285. 
34 Ibid., para. 369. 
35 Kokott & Sobotta (2012), p. 1015. See also e.g. De Búrca (2010). 
36 De Búrca (2010), p. 1. 
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and institutions”.37 Others, such as human rights advocators, celebrated the 
judgment. By some, it was said to be “[s]trengthening the rule of law, but 
fragmenting international law”.38  
 
The case does not directly concern extraterritorial application of human rights 
treaties, which is the main focus of this essay. However, Kadi and Al Barakaat is 
of interest in this context because the application of a human rights treaty in 
the context of a UN peacekeeping operation, in addition to the question of 
extraterritoriality, concerns the relationship between the human rights treaty in 
question and UN Security Council resolutions. Compared to the judgment of 
the ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati, it displays a fundamentally different 
perception of international law and the approach to the relationship between 
different components of the international legal order such as regional courts in 
relation to the global UN system. The possibility of regional courts to review 
acts and omissions in the course of implementing UN Security Council 
resolutions, i.e. actions and omissions by soldiers in peacekeeping operations, 
is further discussed in chapter 4. 
2.1.3 Privileges, immunities and accountability in 
UN peacekeeping operations – different rules 
apply to different categories of personnel 
In UN peacekeeping operations, there are different categories of personnel. 
The operations can consist of a civilian component, a military component and 
a civilian police component. Because of their different legal status, different 
rules and disciplinary procedures apply.39 The categories are: 
 
• UN staff, formally appointed by the Secretary-General and subject to 
his authority. These persons have the status of officials under the 1946 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
(1946 Convention) and are thus immune from legal process in the host 
State regarding acts performed in their official capacity, according to 
Article V, Section 18 (a) of the 1946 Convention.40  
• UN civilian police and military observers, who are considered as 
experts on mission in the meaning of the 1946 Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.41 They are also 
immune from legal process in the host State according to Article VI, 
Section 22 of the 1946 Convention. 
• Members of national military contingents, who enjoy the privileges and 
immunities in the status-of-forces agreement.42 Where no such 
agreement has been concluded or until it is concluded, the model 
status-of-forces agreement contains provisions on privileges and 
immunities. This agreement states that all members of UN 
                                                
37 De Búrca (2010), p. 1. 
38 See Ziegler (2009). 
39 Zeid Report, para. 14, p. 10.  
40 Ibid., Annex, para. A.1, p. 32.  
41 Ibid., Annex, para. A.14, p. 36. 
42 Ibid., Annex, para. A.27, p. 38. 
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peacekeeping operations are immune from legal process in the host 
State in respect of acts performed in their official capacity.43 The model 
status-of-forces agreement also provides that criminal jurisdiction and 
disciplinary matters over military members of military contingents stay 
with the sending State.44 
 
Accordingly, just like State officials, representatives of international 
organisations such as the UN may under certain circumstances enjoy 
immunity. The idea behind the concept of immunity is based on considerations 
of functional necessity and aims to facilitate for State officials and officials of 
international organisations to effectively carry out their functions.45 For 
example, UN staff (first category above) in a peacekeeping mission cannot be 
prosecuted by host State authorities. According to Article 105 of the UN 
Charter, “[t]he Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its 
purposes.” Further, “[r]epresentatives of the Members of the United Nations 
and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in 
connection with the Organization” (second paragraph). Regarding international 
organisations there are treaties regulating the privileges and immunities enjoyed 
by officials of those organisations. The 1946 Convention mentioned above, 
and the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized 
Agencies, contain more detailed rules on this topic than the UN Charter. 
According to Article V, Section 20 of the 1946 Convention, the Secretary-
General has the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official in any 
case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice 
and it can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the UN.  
 
However, the rules on immunity referred to above apply to UN staff and 
experts on mission (such as civilian police and military observers46), i.e. the first 
and second categories, but not to military personnel, i.e. the third category. 
Since the majority of allegations of misconduct reported is directed against 
military members of national contingents and since they constitute the majority 
of the total personnel in peacekeeping operations47, as well as due to space 
limitations, the focus of this essay is on the third category of personnel. As 
outlined above, regarding these persons, criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary 
matters stay with the sending State and investigation and prosecution of crimes 
committed by members of national contingents should therefore be carried out 
by domestic authorities of the sending State. Members of military contingents 
enjoy the privileges and immunities laid down in the status-of-forces 
agreement.48 Where no such agreement has been concluded, the model status-
of-forces agreement provides that criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary matters 
                                                
43 Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations, para. 46. 
44 Ibid., para. 47 (b). 
45 Evans (2014), p. 399. 
46 Zeid Report, para. 18, p. 11. 
47 Ibid., para. 9, p. 9; in 2004, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations received 16 
allegations of sexual exploitation and/or sexual abuse against civilians, 9 against civilian police 
and 80 against military personnel. See also Wills (2013), p. 48. 
48 Zeid Report, Annex, para. A.27, p. 38. 
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stay with the sending State.49 In order for the sending State to be able to 
prosecute these crimes, there must be domestic provisions in place enabling 
for the prosecution of acts committed extraterritorially, which is not the case in 
all States.50 
 
It follows that sometimes, where the sending State is unable or unwilling to 
prosecute acts of sexual exploitation or abuse, there is an accountability gap 
where human rights violations are committed by military members of national 
contingents. These persons remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
sending State, but the State in question sometimes fails to prosecute, for 
different reasons. As is outlined in chapter 2.2.1, measures have been taken at 
the UN level to combat the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse, but 
the recent allegations in, inter alia, the Central African Republic, show that the 
problem persists and impunity remains a problem.    
2.2 Sexual exploitation and abuse in the course 
of UN peacekeeping operations – old news 
In 2015, human rights organisations and media have repeatedly reported on 
UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic committing crimes such as 
rape and other sexual exploitation and abuse against the civilian population. 
Regrettably, sexual exploitation and abuse by military, civilian police and 
civilian UN peacekeeping personnel is not a new phenomenon. As mentioned 
above (chapter 1.1), it has been known since the early 1990s. In 2003, the 
Secretary-General published a bulletin containing detailed rules prohibiting 
such acts, mandatory for all UN staff.51 Nowadays, the UN has a zero 
tolerance policy with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse by its own 
personnel.52 Considering recent allegations, it is evident that the zero tolerance 
policy has not been successful, and that the problem of sexual exploitation and 
abuse by UN peacekeepers persists.  
 
In the Secretary-General’s bulletin from 2003, “sexual exploitation” is defined 
as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential 
power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting 
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.” 
“Sexual abuse” is defined as “the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a 
sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions”.53 
                                                
49 Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations, para. 47 (b). 
50 Wills (2013), p. 51. 
51 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. 
52 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/cdu.shtml (acquired 11 October 2015).  
53 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, 
Section 1. 
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2.2.1 Measures taken to combat sexual exploitation 
and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations – 
the Zeid Report 
Roughly ten years ago, after a series of allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse against UN peacekeepers, the then Permanent Representative of Jordan 
(a major troop-contributing country) to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-
Hussein (current UN High Commissioner for Human Rights), was asked by 
the Secretary-General to create a strategy for addressing the issue. 
Consequently, in 2005, the UN Secretary-General Report A Comprehensive 
Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (commonly referred to as the Zeid Report) was released. 
The Zeid Report recommended engaging troop contributing countries, other 
UN Member States and the entire UN system in a new conduct and 
disciplining architecture for peacekeeping and contained a number of concrete 
recommendations, ranging from the proliferation of UN standards of conduct, 
to, inter alia, reforming investigation processes and establishing individual 
disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability.54  
 
Since the release of the Zeid Report in 2005, a number of measures have been 
taken within the UN system to combat the problem of sexual exploitation and 
abuse committed by peacekeeping personnel. For example, the Zeid Report 
recommended that the model memorandum of understanding between the UN 
and the troop-contributing nations should be amended to provide that, if an 
investigation shows that a member of a national contingent committed an act 
of sexual exploitation or abuse, the sending State in question must agree to 
forward the case to its competent national or military authorities to be 
considered for prosecution, in accordance with its laws, and to report the 
results to the Secretary-General.55 In 2007, the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations (also known as C-34) approved a revised draft model 
memorandum of understanding between the UN and troop-contributing 
nations, which was amended in accordance with the recommendations 
contained in the Zeid Report.56 According to the revised memorandum of 
understanding, the sending State has ten days from the time at which it is 
notified of the allegations of misconduct of its contingent to initiate an 
investigation.57 The adoption of the revised model memorandum of 
understanding together with other measures have led to some improvement in 
making troop-contributing nations hold the perpetrators accountable, but 
impunity remains a significant problem.58  
 
Furthermore, a “three-pronged strategy” has been adopted in order to hold 
personnel accountable to the highest standards of behaviour, focusing on 
                                                
54 See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/reform.shtml (acquired 11 October 
2015). 
55 Zeid Report, p. 5. 
56 See Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, 
Revised draft model memorandum of understanding. 
57 Wills (2013), p. 52. 
58 Ibid., p. 53. 
 19 
prevention, enforcement and remediation.59 In 2007 a Conduct and Discipline 
Unit was established and it can also be mentioned that the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly (Legal Affairs) has been discussing a Convention on the 
Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission, 
but little progress has been made. Further, the proposed convention would not 
apply to personnel assigned to the military component of a UN peacekeeping 
operation, but only UN staff and experts on mission.60 
 
Despite the measures taken after the release of the Zeid Report, the issue of 
accountability of perpetrators remains a challenge. According to the 
conclusions of the Zeid Report, a problem was that while investigating 
allegations against military members of national contingents was the 
responsibility of the sending State, many States remained reluctant to admitting 
misconduct by their troops.61 According to some, that is especially the case 
where the misconduct can be traced back to inadequate training of the 
troops.62 Today, every memorandum of understanding requires reporting, and 
the Conduct and Discipline Unit monitors and exercises pressure on troop-
contributing nations in order to make them take the action required.63 In 
conclusion, measures have been taken, but ten years after the release of the 
Zeid Report the problem persists, as allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse by peacekeeping personnel continue being reported.  
2.3 A comment on certain aspects of troop 
contributing 
In the context of contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, there are some 
political aspects that are of significance. Troop-contributing nations are 
reimbursed for their contributions by the UN and the level of the 
compensation is traditionally a contested issue among UN Member States. It is 
a politically sensitive issue between richer Member States, which in practice pay 
most of the costs for peacekeeping operations without participating to a larger 
extent, and less rich Member States which do not contribute financially as 
much but which send most of the troops. 
 
Currently, the ten largest troop contributors are64: 
 
1. Ethiopia (8161 troops) 
2. Bangladesh (8135 troops) 
3. Pakistan (7109 troops) 
4. India (6716 troops) 
5. Rwanda (5135 troops) 
6. Nepal (4299 troops) 
                                                
59 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf (acquired 11 
October 2015). 
60 Wills (2013), p. 53. 
61 Zeid Report, para. 67 (a), p. 24. 
62 Stern (2015), p. 10. 
63 Ibid., p. 14. 
64 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (numbers 
acquired on 11 October 2015). 
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7. China (2882 troops)  
8. Ghana (2820 troops) 
9. Burkina Faso (2525 troops) 
10. Indonesia (2524 troops) 
 
The top ten providers of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operation 
budget in 2013–2015 are65: 
 
1. United States (28.38 %) 
2. Japan (10.83 %) 
3. France (7.22 %) 
4. Germany (7.14 %) 
5. United Kingdom (6.68 %) 
6. China (6.64 %) 
7. Italy (4.45 %)  
8. Russian Federation (3.15 %) 
9. Canada (2.98 %) 
10. Spain (2.97 %) 
 
The reimbursement is paid to the troop-contributing nation for the services of 
their contingents and is meant to cover the costs of providing troops. This 
fixed rate is paid by the UN directly to the governments of troop contributing 
nations and once it is received, governments are free to use the money as they 
wish.66 There are significant differences among States as to the extent to which 
the reimbursement is actually received by the personnel. In some cases, 
reimbursements have been kept by the governments and even partly taken by 
senior politicians.67 Furthermore, there are of course financial incentives for 
the individual to becoming a UN peacekeeper. These circumstances also have 
the potential of thriving corruption in troop selection processes.68 
 
As shown by the numbers above, the largest financial contributors are 
completely different from the largest contributors in terms of military 
personnel. The financial incentives for States of contributing troops as well as 
that of the individual to becoming a UN peacekeeper cannot be neglected in 
this context. If a main reason for contributing with troops to peacekeeping 
mission is the income, the government of the troop contributing nation might 
be reluctant to “naming and shaming”, admitting publicly to misconduct or 
investigating and prosecuting where allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse occur. Many major troop-contributing countries are not as rich or 
developed as the major financial contributors. In many cases, the legal systems 
of the troop-contributing nation is not very developed, which of course is also 
likely to affect the possibilities of investigating and prosecuting allegations of 
misconduct.   
                                                
65 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml (numbers acquired on 11 
October 2015). 
66 Transparency International UK (2013), p. 36. 
67 Ibid., p. 36; which uses an example from the Philippine national army, where peacekeepers 
have been continuously denied funds. 
68 Ibid., p. 35. 
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2.4 An example: United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) 
In 2015, media reported on new allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by UN peacekeepers against civilians, this time regarding, inter alia, 
French peacekeepers part of the MINUSCA operation in the Central African 
Republic. As initially outlined, it is not claimed that the problem is more 
prevalent in some contexts than in others or that military personnel from some 
countries are worse than others. The specific situation regarding acts of sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by French UN peacekeepers in the Central 
African Republic is used as an example in order to concretise the problems 
that arise, and using an example involving a European State also raises the 
question of the applicability of the ECHR. This chapter aims to problematise 
the current legal framework regulating UN peacekeeping and its apparent 
inability to manage situations such as that arising in relation to the MINUSCA 
example.  
2.4.1 The mandate of MINUSCA 
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the 
Central African Republic (hereafter MINUSCA) was established through 
Security Council resolution 2149 (2014).69 MINUSCA is concerned with the 
security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in the Central African 
Republic and its regional implications, and the protection of civilians is its 
utmost priority.70 Its mandate includes the promotion and protection of human 
rights.71 MINUSCA’s mandate was renewed in April 2015 through Security 
Council Resolution 2217 (2015).72 MINUSCA was authorised by the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, to take “[…] all necessary 
means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of 
deployment”.73  
2.4.2 Allegations of human rights violations by UN 
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic 
In 2015, media reported on repeated allegations of sexual exploitation and 
sexual abuse against civilians by UN peacekeepers in the Central African 
Republic. The UN official Anders Kompass had leaked a report containing 
allegations against French troops, and the issue gained significant media 
attention, and the UN was heavily criticised for its initial handling of the 
                                                
69 S/RES/2149 (2014), 10 April 2014. 
70 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/ (acquired 11 October 2015); see 
also S/RES/2149 (2014) 28 April 2015, para. 30 (a). 
71 S/RES/2149 (2014), para. 30 (e). 
72 http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11875.doc.htm (acquired 11 October 2015); see also 
S/RES/2217 (2015), 28 April 2015, para. 22. 
73 S/RES/2149 (2014), para. 29. 
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situation, including the suspension of Kompass that followed.74 He was 
subsequently exonerated in a report of an independent review.75 Allegedly, six 
boys between 9 and 13 years old had either been abused themselves or had 
witnessed sexual abuse of other children in exchange for food.76 Subsequently, 
several allegations of misconduct, including regarding sexual exploitation and 
abuse in some cases, have been made against military personnel from, inter alia, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Burundi and 
Morocco.77 As described in chapter 1.1, this is far from the first time UN 
peacekeepers are accused of human rights violations.  
 
MINUSCA has pronounced that it is determined to investigate fully into the 
allegations and hold the perpetrators to account. The spokesperson Vannina 
Maestracci has stated that the investigation is complicated by the numerous 
nationalities of police and military personnel involved.78 It is problematic that 
criminal jurisdiction stays with the sending State since the matter is dealt with 
differently in different States, as this impedes coherency and foreseeability. 
These are reasons why the need for a “global solution” is stressed in this essay 
(see chapter 5). In the following (chapter 4.3), the situation in the Central 
African Republic is used as an example and the potential application of human 
rights treaties in this context is discussed. As has been outlined in the 
introductory chapter, the example has been chosen in order to illustrate that 
the problem is real and that the UN system has not been successful in 
addressing impunity. Peacekeepers from a large number of States and part of 
different operations have been accused of misconduct, not only the State and 
the operation used as an example in this essay. However, using a case where 
the alleged perpetrators come from a European State as example allows us to 
examine the possibility for victims of using the ECHR as a legal venue. For the 
record, it should be mentioned that in the case that serves as an example for 
the purpose of this essay, French authorities have started investigations into 
the allegations.79  
2.5 Reflections – lack of legal venues for 
victims of human rights violations 
committed by military members of national 
contingents 
As mentioned above, where military members of national contingents are 
concerned, criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary matters stay within the 
                                                
74 See e.g. 3 Peacekeepers Accused of Rape in Central African Republic, The New York Times (2015).  
75 UN accused of ’gross failure’ over alleged sexual abuse by French troops, The Guardian (2015). See also 
Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic 
(2015). 
76 Human Rights Watch (2015).  
77 See e.g. 3 Peacekeepers Accused of Rape in Central African Republic, The New York Times (2015). 
78 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51654#.VdLn0FPtmko (acquired 11 
October 2015).  
79 See e.g. UN aid worker suspended for leaking report on child abuse by French troops, The Guardian 
(2015). 
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competence of the sending State. Thus, the responsibility to prosecute human 
rights violations committed by them lies primarily with the sending State. 
However, in practice this does not always work satisfactorily since the sending 
State, for different reasons, do not take the action that is required in order to 
hold perpetrators accountable. Of course it cannot be demanded that every 
allegation leads to prosecution, for evidentiary issues or as some allegations 
may be unfounded. What can be required is, however, that where there is a 
well-founded allegation of sexual exploitation, abuse or other misconduct, a 
serious investigation is undertaken by the sending State. Prosecution of these 
crimes is of course of utmost importance in addressing impunity, since many 
host States lack a functioning judicial system. Victims who are citizens of the 
host State are therefore often without legal protection from this kind of 
exploitation and abuse. As is outlined below (see chapter 4.3.1), under the 
ECHR, Contracting States are under a positive obligation to undertake an 
effective investigation were there is a well-founded allegation of rape or other 
conduct contrary to for example Article 3. Such an obligation would perhaps 
be feasible also in the context of UN peacekeeping.   
 
In many cases, a fundamental problem is that the troop-contributing nation is 
unwilling to prosecute human rights violations committed by its troops.80 It 
may be so for different reasons; one that has often been put forward by troop-
contributing nations is that the evidence gathered by the UN investigation or 
investigation carried out by local authorities would not suffice in a criminal 
proceeding in the sending State.81 It is also possible that sometimes the sending 
State is unable to prosecute or lacks the proper resources or legal system to be 
able to carry out such an investigation. For example, some States lack legal 
provisions that enable the prosecution of domestic crimes performed 
extraterritorially.82 As has been outlined above (see chapter 2.3), troop-
contributing nations often have a financial interest in contributing with troops 
to UN peacekeeping operations and it is a significant source of income for 
some states. The unwillingness of some sending States to investigate, taken 
together with the absence of judicial systems in many host States, entails a 
significant risk for impunity for these crimes. Some troop-contributing nations 
might also lack a functioning judicial system themselves.  
 
The issue of impunity must, of course, be addressed. The UN has through 
several measures been trying to do so (see chapter 2.2.1). However, recent 
repeated allegations of misconduct by peacekeepers in the Central African 
Republic show that the measures have not been completely successful. While 
some cases of misconduct will probably always occur every now and then, it 
can be argued that other, more demanding, measures must be taken to further 
address the problem. The Zeid Report suggested many preventive measures 
that would to some extent address the root causes, which are of course 
welcome. However, I am of the opinion that the issue of impunity was not 
addressed enough. Impunity might be one of the most significant questions to 
address. Not doing so sends the message to the international community as a 
whole, and not least to the local population affected by these acts by UN 
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personnel, that the problem is not taken seriously and that it is even tolerated. 
Further, the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse severely damage the 
image of the UN. It is possible that wearing the blue helmet to some no longer 
means what it was supposed to mean.  
 
In this context, another problem is that pushing troop-contributing nations to 
taking measures, such as prosecuting or legislating, might discourage them 
from contributing to UN peacekeeping. Taking such measures might be 
perceived as a question of sovereignty and integrity. In relation to this, 
however, I am inclined to agree with Professor Siobhán Wills who argues that 
in order for the UN to meet its own rule of law standards, it must prioritise 
accountability, establish effective mechanisms of ensuring that perpetrators of 
crimes are punished and also be prepared to decline to accept troop 
contributions from States with a poor accountability record – even if it implies 
difficulties in ensuring enough contributions.83 Professor Nigel D. White 
argues that the sending States should not have the sole jurisdiction over alleged 
human rights violations by its contingents. Where the sending State is unwilling 
to assign jurisdiction to the UN, they should be required to prosecute alleged 
human rights violations.84 Since States are, apparently, sometimes unwilling to 
do so, I believe that there is a need for an international oversight mechanism 
of some kind for this purpose. 
 
Stricter requirements on the troop-contributing nations are key to reaching a 
better accountability record. However, in my opinion, other measures are 
required as well. Some have suggested the drafting of a specific UN 
convention based regime, specifically tailored to ensuring that peacekeepers are 
held accountable to internationally agreed standards, for this matter.85 Another 
alternative could be the establishment of a special commission, tribunal or 
court. In a regional context, I am of the opinion that the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has the potential to take a leading role and set an 
example in how claims could be brought against and how accountability could 
be handled in relation to Council of Europe Member States. This chapter has 
aimed to shed light on the challenges to holding UN peacekeepers and the 
sending States accountable for human rights violations. In chapters 4 and 5, 
possible solutions are proposed and discussed.  
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3 Extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
attribution of conduct 
3.1 Jurisdiction – different implications in 
different fields of international law 
Jurisdiction is a notion of essential importance to understanding international 
law in general, and in particular to understanding how human rights treaties 
operate in relation to the questions posed in this essay. It is a multifaceted 
notion and can have different meanings in different contexts. It concerns the 
limits of the legal competence of States to make, apply and enforce laws upon 
persons.86 The term is also used when describing the right of international 
courts and tribunals, such as the ICJ or the ECtHR, to rule in certain cases.87 
Both the jurisdiction of States and that of international courts and tribunals 
relate to the concept of the scope of the powers of a legal institution, but the 
types of jurisdiction are often distinguished between and treated separately for 
practical reasons.88  
3.1.1 Jurisdiction in public international law 
When it comes to State jurisdiction, it is often talked about different bases  of 
jurisdiction (the territorial, personal, protective, universality principles) and 
different types of jurisdiction (prescribe, adjudicate, enforce).89 In addition to 
this, one can talk about the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In public 
international law, jurisdiction is often referred to as an aspect of sovereignty.90 
 
The territorial principle has received universal recognition, and hinges on the idea 
that the courts of the State where a crime is committed may exercise 
jurisdiction.91 The (active) nationality principle, on the other hand, presupposes that 
a State has jurisdiction over acts committed by its nationals, and is generally 
recognised as a basis for extraterritorial acts.92 In terms of international 
criminal law, this principle would be relevant to the situation where military 
members of national contingents commit crimes in the course of a UN 
peacekeeping operation. However, the main focus of this essay in terms of 
jurisdiction is that of human rights treaties and (extraterritorial) jurisdiction. 
According to the passive nationality principle, the nationality of the victim is 
decisive. It stipulates that a State can exercise jurisdiction where an alien 
commit acts harmful to nationals of the forum State, but has not gained 
particularly wide support.93 There is also the protective or security principle according 
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to which States may exercise jurisdiction over acts committed abroad which 
affect the security of the State. However, the interpretation of the scope of this 
principle varies widely from State to State.94 Finally, the universality principle opens 
up for the possibility of a State to exercise jurisdiction over acts committed by 
aliens where the circumstances or the nature of the crime justify its repression 
“as a matter of international public policy”.95 Such crimes could be genocide or 
murder, where the State that would exercise jurisdiction according to the 
territorial principle is unable to do so.  
3.1.2 Human rights treaties and jurisdiction 
As mentioned above, the concept of State jurisdiction is often distinguished 
from that of international courts and tribunals. In the context of a human 
rights treaties, jurisdiction is often perceived differently compared to in the 
context of public international law. As is elaborated upon in the following 
(chapter 3.3.3), the ECHR prescribes that States shall secure to “everyone 
within their jurisdiction” the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. 
The ICCPR imposes on States parties to respect and ensure to “all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” the rights in the Covenant.  
 
In human rights treaties, the term “jurisdiction” serves as a threshold criterion 
that must be fulfilled in order for the treaty in question to apply at all.96 In 
other words, it is a necessary prerequisite for indivuals’ enjoyment of human 
rights. How this threshold criterion operates is subject to discussion in the 
following. Judging from the case law of the human rights bodies within the 
scope of this study, it seems like the spatial model (see chapter 3.2.1) has been 
the general rule, from which exceptions are made under certain circumstances. 
A central judgment in this aspect is that of the ECtHR in the Bankovic case, 
where it was ruled that “[…] from the standpoint of public international law, 
the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial”97. As is shown 
in the following, however, the ECtHR has allowed numerous exceptions from 
what seemed to be the general rule of jurisdiction as something primarily 
territorial, and the decision in Bankovic seems to have been superseded. 
Understanding the notion of jurisdiction in the context of human rights law is 
crucial for the purpose of this essay. In the following, the notion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is described and analysed. 
3.2 Extraterritorial jurisdiction and human 
rights treaties 
Public international law is mainly concerned with the relations between States, 
with significant focus on notions such as sovereignty, jurisdiction and 
territoriality. Human rights law, on the other hand, focuses on the relationship 
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between the individual and the State. As explained above, jurisdiction in terms 
of human rights law often serves as a threshold criterion, which must be 
fulfilled in order for the treaty in question and the rights and freedoms 
contained therein to apply. Jurisdiction has often been conceived as a territorial 
notion. However, an increasingly complex world and an increased globalisation 
pose challenges to this conception; actions by State agents outside of the 
territory of their home State may affect the human rights of individuals there, 
or acts committed in one State may affect human rights of individuals in 
another. A satisfactory human rights protection should be guaranteed also in 
these situations. In the reality of a globalised world, it can be argued that 
human rights law is lagging behind.98 Therefore, when applied correctly, the 
notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction may offer a better human rights 
protection where States violate human rights of individuals outside of their 
territory, as it enables the application of a human rights treaty outside of the 
physical territory of the State. Instead of focusing on the horizontal 
relationship between States and the vertical relationship between the State and 
its citizens only, the notion of extraterritoriality enables us to deal with the 
“diagonal” relationship between outside actors and citizens in other countries.99     
 
In the following (chapters 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), it is shown that both the HRC and 
the ECtHR have acknowledged that States Parties to the respective treaty may 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain circumstances. According to 
for example Marko Milanovic at the University of Nottingham, there are in 
principle two different forms or models of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this 
context; jurisdiction as control over territory, and jurisdiction as control over 
individuals.100 In addition to this, Milanovic advocates for a third model, which 
distinguishes between positive and negative obligations, as a possible solution 
to some of the problems that arise in relation to the first two models.101 In the 
following, the different models of extraterritorial jurisdiction are explored in 
order to lay the foundation for understanding the case law of the human rights 
bodies in the scope of this study, thereby enabling for analysis and criticism, 
and in order to put forward proposals for alternative solutions. 
3.2.1 The spatial model – jurisdiction as control over 
territory 
The spatial model of jurisdiction is the model with the most textual support in 
human rights treaties.102 It defines extraterritorial jurisdiction as depending on a 
State’s “effective overall control” over territory or an area. Under the ECHR, 
State jurisdiction may arise outside of the State’s national territory regardless of 
whether such control has been legally or illegally obtained as a consequence of 
military action.103 According to the spatial model, the question of what degree 
of control is required and what is meant by an “area” is obviously of significant 
importance. However, this will not be dealt with in detail here. It suffices in 
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this context to establish that a certain degree of control over the territory is 
required.  
 
Not only the ECtHR, but also other international law bodies such as the 
Human Rights Committee and the International Court of Justice, have 
acknowledged the existence of this model.104 Applying the spatial model only 
would in practice mean that States could disregard their obligations according 
to the human rights instrument in question whenever they do not reach the 
requirement of exercising “effective control” over the area. Therefore, it can be 
argued that this model alone would not be enough from a human rights based 
perspective, since there are many situations where States act extraterritorially 
and violate human rights of individuals without exercising de facto control 
over the territory.105 There are many examples of such situations, one of which 
can be mentioned is where the US tortured persons detained in CIA “black 
sites” placed in territories outside of its own control and jurisdiction. However, 
in this situation the US clearly remained control over the actual acts of its 
agents and control over the individuals concerned.106 Not regarding this as a 
violation of the prohibition of torture simply because the acts were committed 
outside of US territory might seem counterintuitive from a human rights 
perspective. An additional model might therefore be required in order to create 
a satisfactory human rights protection where the responsible State does not 
exercise such effective control over the area where the human rights violations 
in question are committed.  
3.2.2 The personal model – jurisdiction as control 
over individuals 
As outlined above, in order to ensure individuals an accurate level of 
protection in situations where their human rights are violated but effective 
control over the area is not exercised by the State in question, another 
jurisdiction model is needed. The personal model of jurisdiction hinges on the 
idea that extraterritorial jurisdiction arises where the State exercises authority 
and control over the individual, rather than over an area, for example where an 
individual is taken into custody or detention.107 The personal, rather than the 
territorial, model of jurisdiction would solve some of the problems with the 
spatial model described above, since it would significantly expand the scope of 
human rights treaties and hence the protection of human rights to situations 
where the spatial model alone would not be enough. However, this model too 
has its problematic aspects, and how far the personal model can be drawn 
remains uncertain.108 
 
A general drawback with the personal model of jurisdiction is that it runs 
contrary to the language of some human rights treaties that construct 
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jurisdiction in terms of territory only.109 Another drawback that can be argued 
for is that applying the personal model too generously would imply that 
jurisdiction would lose its character as a threshold criterion and it would 
therefore be impossible to principally limit.110 In the words of Milanovic, the 
personal model would “collapse”; States would have obligations under the 
human rights treaty in question towards all persons whose human rights it 
could possibly violate. The effect would then be that jurisdiction would serve 
no purpose as a threshold criterion.111 A limit of some sort would therefore 
have to be put in place in order for the personal model to be useful. 
3.2.3 A third model – distinguishing between 
positive and negative obligations 
As has been outlined above, both the spatial and the personal model of 
jurisdiction have their flaws. None of them seem to give a completely 
satisfactory human rights protection. For this reason, Milanovic has suggested 
a third model. This model distinguishes between negative and positive 
obligations.112 In short, a negative obligation is an obligation not to infringe a 
right. A positive obligation requires the State in question to take the necessary 
measures to safeguard a right.  
 
In short, this model of jurisdiction suggests that a State is bound to comply 
with its negative obligations extraterritorially, in all times and places, 
irrespective of whether jurisdiction is exercised or not. The rationale behind 
this is that States are always able to control the acts of their organs or agents, 
no matter where in the world they are committed.113 With regard to their 
positive obligations, States would only have to comply with these obligations 
within territories under their control, and the threshold criterion would hence 
still be relevant with regard to the positive obligations.114 The reason for this is 
the argument that it is only where a State possesses a certain degree of control 
over an area that the positive obligations can be realistically complied with.115 
In other words, where a State controls an area, that State is also capable of 
ensuring individuals the enjoyment of all rights and freedoms contained in the 
human rights treaty in question, including positive obligations. According to 
this model, jurisdiction is perceived as only territorial and the personal model 
(chapter 3.2.2) would therefore be superfluous. In the case of the ECHR, the 
spatial model allows the ECtHR to retain some rigour to the Article 1 
jurisdiction threshold, while the same is not true for the personal model.116 
Consequently, would the third jurisdiction model be implemented, an 
individual who for example were subjected to torture by State agents 
extraterritorially would always be able to bring a legal claim against that State 
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before the ECtHR, regardless of whether the State exercised control over the 
area or the individual, because States have a negative obligation not to subject 
individuals to torture or other treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. 
Chapter 4.3.1.3 will reconnect to the third model of jurisdiction. 
3.3 Extraterritorial jurisdiction in the 
jurisprudence of some international law 
bodies 
The notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been acknowledged by a number 
of international law bodies. The ICJ has played a role in the protection of 
human rights and the development of extraterritorial application of treaties, 
while the ECtHR is the international human rights law body that has applied 
the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction most frequently. In the following, this 
development is explored and particular emphasis is placed upon the 
development of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in terms of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, in order to lay the foundation for a discussion as to the possibility 
of applying the ECHR extraterritorially to the events in the Central African 
Republic.   
3.3.1 International Court of Justice and 
extraterritorial application of human rights 
treaties 
While not a specialist human rights court as such, the ICJ has played a 
significant role in the protection of human rights and has in several cases been 
involved with human rights issues117, including regarding the extraterritorial 
application of human rights treaties. This involvement has, according to some 
observers, to do with the general trend towards mainstreaming human rights 
issues within the entire UN system.118 
 
The Namibia Advisory Opinion119 was issued in 1971, which was before the 
question of extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties had been 
subject to the scrutiny of any of the international human rights law bodies. The 
specific circumstances of the case will not be dealt with in detail here. In short, 
South Africa was unlawfully occupying Namibia, and the ICJ ruled that South 
Africa was accountable for violations of the rights of the people of Namibia. 
Further, it was stated that the fact that “[…] South Africa no longer has any 
title to administer the Territory does not release it from its obligations and 
responsibilities under international law towards other States in respect of the 
exercise of its powers in relation to this Territory. Physical control of a 
territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability 
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for acts affecting other States”.120 Though this case did not concern human 
rights treaties specifically, it can be argued that it was important in paving the 
way for the subsequent development of extraterritorial application of human 
rights treaties and pronouncing that actual physical control of a territory is 
decisive, corresponding to the spatial model referred to above (chapter 
3.2.1).121  
 
In the Wall Advisory Opinion122, one of the issues concerned whether the 
international human rights conventions to which Israel is a State party (in this 
case ICCPR, ICESCR and CRC) were applicable within the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory.123 In this respect, the ICJ pointed out that while primarily 
territorial, the jurisdiction of a State may sometimes be exercised outside 
national territory.124 The ICJ found that the ICCPR was applicable regarding 
acts carried out by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, 
with reference to the Concluding Observations made by the HRC regarding 
Israel.125 The extraterritorial application of the ICCPR was affirmed in the 
DRC v. Uganda case.126  
 
The ICJ has not elaborated upon the detailed principles on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. To a large extent, this is explained by the role and function of the 
ICJ as opposed that of, for example, the ECtHR. The jurisprudence of the ICJ 
concerns inter-State disputes, and according to Article 34 of the Statute of the 
ICJ individuals do not have standing before it. Its main function is not that of 
enforcement of the law or providing remedies, but interpreting the meaning of 
the law on a more abstract level.127 In light of this, the fact that the ICJ has 
acknowledged the notion of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties 
as such is important. Besides from the Namibia case paving the way for the 
development of the extraterritorial application of international law, the case law 
of the ICJ further strengthens the notion of extraterritorial application of 
human rights treaties as such. The jurisprudence of the ICJ in this respect can 
be seen as an important step towards mainstreaming the human rights 
obligations of States. Given the capacity of the ICJ as the principal judiciary 
organ of the UN and given the weight of its judicial decisions as an important 
source of international law, the pronouncement that extraterritorial application 
of human rights treaties is possible is therefore of significance for the way 
human rights develop before other bodies, such as human rights courts and 
tribunals. According to some, by concluding that the ICCPR, the ICESCR and 
the CRC may apply extraterritorially, the ICJ has “[…] universalised the 
territorial applicability of human rights law and circumvented the traditional 
sovereign power of States in depriving individuals, irrespective of their 
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nationality, of their human rights and respect for human dignity”.128 This could 
be a step forward for the cause of human dignity, and a step backward for the 
traditional narrow meaning of State sovereignty. By reaching that conclusion, 
the ICJ significantly broadened the scope of the human rights instruments in 
question.129 
3.3.2 ICCPR and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
As outlined above, the ICCPR can apply extraterritorially. Article 2.1 of the 
ICCPR states that: 
 
“[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant[…]” (emphasis added).  
 
Hence, unlike the ECHR (see chapter 3.3.3), the ICCPR speaks of jurisdiction 
explicitly in terms of territory. The wording of the article could be perceived as 
suggesting that in order for an individual to be able to claim the rights of the 
Covenant, that person must be both within the territory and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the State in question. Some States, for example the US and 
Israel, have argued for such an interpretation.130 However, the HRC has 
explained that the Article means that State Parties “[…] must respect and 
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or 
effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of 
the State Party.”131 The HRC has further held that “[…] those within the 
power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its 
territory […] such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party 
assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operation” must 
also be able to enjoy the rights set forth in the Covenant.132 Hence, the ICCPR 
may apply extraterritorially under certain circumstances. As outlined in chapter 
3.3.1, this interpretation is supported by the ICJ.133 The wording of the HRC 
General Comment no. 31 (“[…]within the power or effective control of that State 
Party[…]” (emphasis added)) suggests that the notion of jurisdiction is given a 
similar meaning here as in the ECHR (see chapter 3.3.3).134 
 
The case law of the HRC regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction is not as 
extensive as that of the ECtHR, and it has therefore not elaborated the 
principles on jurisdiction to the same extent. However, in the López Burgos 
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decision135, which concerned the kidnapping of a Uruguayan national by 
Uruguayan security and intelligence forces in Argentina, the HRC held that 
“[…] it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 
2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not 
perpetrate on its own territory”.136 Consequently, extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
terms of the ICCPR is possible, but detailed principles have not been 
elaborated by the HRC to date.  
 
However, it can be argued that the considerations by the HRC are essential for 
the purpose of understanding the evolution of the case law of the ECtHR. In 
Issa and others v. Turkey137, the ECtHR disregarded the submission by the 
Turkish Government that were based on the previous Bankovic judgment (in 
which the ECtHR had stated that jurisdiction is “primarily territorial”; see 
chapter 3.3.3), and cited views from, inter alia, the HRC in the López Burgos and 
Celiberti di Casariego cases when concluding that a State indeed can be held 
accountable for violations of the ECHR committed on the territory of another 
State.138  
3.3.3 ECHR and extraterritorial jurisdiction – 
starting points 
As mentioned previously, this essay focuses largely on the possibilities of 
bringing a legal claim against the sending State under the ECHR. In this 
context, the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of the ECHR is of 
particular interest. Article 1 of the ECHR states: 
 
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” (emphasis 
added).  
 
What is meant by jurisdiction, and especially extraterritorial jurisdiction, has 
been subject to lengthy debate, and the ECtHR has been somewhat 
inconsistent in its case law as to the meaning of the term. It has been 
established that jurisdiction is a threshold criterion, meaning that the exercise 
of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be 
held responsible for its acts or omissions.139 Traditionally, jurisdiction has been 
perceived as mainly a territorial concept. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a notion 
that, as is shown in the following, has been applied more generously in recent 
years by the ECtHR.  
 
One of the first cases in which the ECtHR dealt with the question of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was Bankovic, which has often been invoked by 
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States in support of the view that extraterritorial jurisdiction should not be 
considered to have arisen. The case concerned the bombardment by NATO 
aircrafts of a building in in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. outside of 
Council of Europe territory). Sixteen people were killed and relatives of the 
victims claimed that 17 NATO and Council of Europe Member States had 
violated their relatives’ rights under Article 2 and Article 10 of the ECHR. 
However, the ECtHR ruled that jurisdiction is “primarily territorial” and that 
the rights and freedoms in the Convention cannot be “[…] divided and 
tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of the extra-territorial 
act in question”140, and the application was therefore declared inadmissible. 
Nevertheless, in recent years the judgment in Bankovic has been, at least partly, 
superseded and the ECtHR has accepted more and more exceptions to the 
general rule of jurisdiction as “primarily territorial”. As is shown in the 
following, there is no doubt that the ECtHR is now accepting extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR, but it remains partly doubtful as to under what 
specific circumstances such application is or should be allowed. 
 
The cases described in the following concern alleged human rights violations 
taking place in Iraq during the occupation by the coalition forces (led by the 
US with a large force from the UK and smaller contingents from Australia, 
Denmark and Poland141) in 2003 and 2004. As opposed to the situation in 
Kosovo in the Behrami and Saramati cases (see chapter 3.4), there was no 
Security Council resolution authorising the use of force in place prior to the 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Subsequent to the invasion, the occupying 
States created the Coalition Provisional Authority to exercise powers of 
Government temporarily, until an Iraqi Government could be formed.142 On 
22 May 2003, Security Council resolution 1483143 was adopted, inter alia, 
acknowledging the status of the United States and the United Kingdom as 
occupying powers.144 Roughly five months later, on 16 October 2003, the 
Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted 
resolution 1511145, through which a Multinational Force was authorised to take 
all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability 
in Iraq and urged member States to contribute assistance, including military 
force, to the Multinational Force.146 
3.3.3.1 Pivotal judgments of the ECtHR on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction 
In the Al-Skeini case, which concerned six people who had been killed by 
British soldiers during security operations in Basra, the ECtHR established a 
                                                
140 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 other Contracting States, paras. 59 and 75. 
141 See Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, para. 10. 
142 Ibid., para. 12, where it is referred to Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, 
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number of principles on extraterritorial jurisdiction that have been cited 
frequently in subsequent cases. The applicants argued that the victims had been 
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom under Article 1 of the ECHR at 
the moment of death and that the United Kingdom had not complied with its 
positive obligation to investigate into the deaths in accordance with Article 2 of 
the ECHR.147 In its judgment, the ECtHR distinguished between two main 
principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction – the State agent authority and control 
principle, and the effective control over an area principle. The principles on 
jurisdiction, elaborated upon in paras. 131–140 of the judgment, can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
a. the territorial principle – a State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 
is primarily territorial. Extraterritorial jurisdiction arises only in 
exceptional cases.  
b. State agent authority and control – an exception to the territorial principle. 
Acts of State authorities which produce effects outside the territory of 
the State may give rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the following 
situations: 
 
i. when diplomatic and consular agents exert authority and 
control over others when present on foreign territory,  
ii. when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
Government of that territory, the State exercises all or some of 
the public powers normally to be exercised by the Government 
of the territory, or that 
iii. the use of force by a State’s agents when operating outside of 
the territory of the State may bring the individual thereby 
brought under the control of the State’s authorities into the 
State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. What is decisive in these cases is 
the exercise of physical power and control over the person in 
question. This type of extraterritorial jurisdiction had before 
Al-Skeini arisen for example where an individual was taken into 
the custody of a State abroad.148 In relation to this, the ECtHR 
explicitly stepped away from its statements in Bankovic. Where 
this type of jurisdiction arises, the State is under an obligation 
to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms of the 
Convention relevant to his or her situation. In this sense, the 
rights and freedoms of the Convention can indeed be “divided 
and tailored”, as opposed to the ECtHR’s decision in 
Bankovic.149 This exception is in many ways similar to the 
personal model described in chapter 3.2.2. 
 
c. effective control over an area – another exception to the territorial principle. 
Where such control is exercised by a State as a consequence of lawful 
or unlawful military action, the State has the responsibility to secure the 
entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those 
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Additional Protocols that it has ratified in that area. When assessing 
whether effective control is exercised, the strength of the military 
presence of the State is the most important factor. This exception 
resembles the spatial model described in chapter 3.2.1. 
 
The ECtHR ruled that the United Kingdom did exercise jurisdiction over the 
situation at the relevant time. In the capacity of Occupying Power, the United 
Kingdom had command of the military division in which the province where 
the events occurred was included. The ECtHR held that the United Kingdom 
also exercised authority and control over the individuals killed by its soldiers 
engaged in security operations. In other words, both the “State agent authority 
and control” (b. – iii.) and “effective control over an area” (c.) principles were 
applied by the ECtHR. This was considered enough so as to establish a 
“jurisdictional link” between the individuals killed and the United Kingdom, 
for the purposes of Article 1.150 
 
In Jaloud151, the jurisdiction question concerned whether the Netherlands had 
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction in Iraq, even though their contributions to 
the military operations were limited and not comparable to those of the United 
Kingdom, which had been considered to exercise jurisdiction in preceding 
cases, such as Al-Skeini. Neither was the Netherlands an occupying power in 
the meaning of international law. The Netherlands troops participated in the 
Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR, a coalition of participating countries led by 
the United States and the United Kingdom152) in battalion strength and were 
during  certain period of time part of a division under the command of an 
officer of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, in accordance with 
Security Council resolution 1483 with the purpose to assist the United 
Kingdom in creating stability and security in Iraq.153 Dutch soldiers shot Mr 
Jaloud to death in a car at a vehicle checkpoint. The merits of the complaints 
concerned an alleged violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2; the 
applicant argued that the investigation into the death of Mr Jaloud had not 
been sufficiently independent.154  
 
The ECtHR reiterated the principles delineated in Al-Skeini, and emphasised 
that while primarily territorial, State jurisdiction may be exercised outside 
national territory under certain circumstances.155 It was further held that the 
status of occupying power is not in itself decisive for the question of exercise 
of jurisdiction.156 Neither is a State relieved from its Convention obligations 
just because the troops are under the operational command of another State.157 
On the contrary, the ECtHR stated that the Netherlands had assumed 
responsibility for the security in the area despite the fact that they were under 
the command of an officer from the United Kingdom, and they had retained 
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full command over their troops.158 According to the ECtHR, the checkpoint 
where Mr Jaloud was shot to death was manned by personnel under the 
command and direct supervision of a Netherlands Royal Army Officer and set 
up in the execution of the SFIR’s mission under UN Security Council 
resolution 1483 and within the limits of this resolution, the Netherlands had 
exercised jurisdiction “[…] for the purpose of asserting authority and control 
over persons passing through the checkpoint”.159 
3.3.3.2 Reflections on extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of 
the ECHR – an increasingly permissive approach by 
the ECtHR 
In my opinion, the recent case law of the ECtHR, particularly the Jaloud 
judgment, represents an increasingly permissive approach towards 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ECtHR. The threshold has been lowered and 
jurisdiction can now arise where a State exercises authority and control over 
persons passing through a checkpoint, rather than only within the territory of 
the State or where the State exercises overall effective control over an area. 
This approach is obviously a way more permissive version of the State agent 
authority and control exception (or version of the personal model) than the 
version based on detention and arrest. Further, it is also clear that the 
conception of ECHR rights as not being able to be “divided and tailored” has 
been, at least partly, abandoned. As the ECtHR held in Al-Skeini, ECHR rights 
can indeed be divided and tailored in the sense that where a State exercises 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over an individual, it is under the obligation to 
secure to that individual the rights and freedoms that are relevant to his or her 
situation.160 In Jaloud, the ECtHR seems to have acknowledged extraterritorial 
jurisdiction on the basis of the personal model, or “for the purpose of asserting 
authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint”, in the 
words of the ECtHR.161 While control over an individual can be relatively easily 
established in cases concerning for example detention, the situation in Jaloud is 
not at all as clear-cut. Some observers perceive the way the ECtHR established 
jurisdiction in Jaloud as a new, expanded, version of personal jurisdiction, in 
addition to that which can arise where State agents hold an individual in arrest 
or detention.162  
 
The judgment in Jaloud has been criticised in the legal doctrine. Generally 
speaking, the ECtHR has moved from the approach that jurisdiction is 
essentially territorial with few exceptions (as in Bankovic) towards allowing 
more exceptions, often based on the personal model. This development has 
been criticised as inconsistent and confusing. In his concurring opinion in Al-
Skeini, ECtHR judge Bonello argued that the case law of the ECtHR regarding 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was “based on a need-to-decide basis, patchwork 
case law at best” and suggested that the ECtHR should “return to the drawing 
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board” in these matters.163 The criticism has continued after the subsequent 
cases on extraterritorial jurisdiction.164  
 
Regardless of one’s opinion on the appropriateness of the recent development 
in the ECtHR’s case law on extraterritoriality, it is clear that its increasingly 
permissive approach opens up for the possibility of extraterritorial application 
of the ECHR in more situations. The relevance of this development for the 
future and for the situation where human rights violations are committed in 
the course of UN mandated peacekeeping operations is discussed in chapter 4. 
Given this development in jurisprudence of the ECtHR on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it is not impossible to imagine that it could arise also in the case 
of, for example, European soldiers part of UN peacekeeping operations 
committing human rights violations in other parts of the world. However, the 
judgment in Behrami and Saramati seems to have, at least for now, excluded the 
possibility of the ECtHR to review such a case. The judgment in Behrami and 
Saramati is described in chapter 3.4 and thereafter it is subject to some 
discussion and criticism, and a different approach to the application of human 
rights treaties in the course of UN peacekeeping operations is suggested.   
3.4 Attribution of conduct – starting points and 
pivotal judgments of the ECtHR 
As outlined above (chapter 1.2), the question of attribution of conduct is 
crucial to the question of allocation of responsibility. The Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO)165 contain rules on the 
attribution of conduct and responsibility where organs or agents of a State are 
placed at the disposal of an international organisation, which is the case with 
military personnel sent to a UN peacekeeping operation by a State. The Draft 
Articles constitute an attempt to codify the principles of allocating 
responsibility where international organisations act, including through State 
organs or agents placed at their disposal. While not directly legally binding and 
perhaps not possessing the same authority as the corresponding draft articles 
on State responsibility166, the work of the ILC in this respect serves as valuable 
guidance to the present position of customary international law in this area.167  
 
According to Article 3 of DARIO, the international responsibility of an 
organisation is entailed where there is an internationally wrongful act of the 
organisation. Article 4 states that there is an internationally wrongful act of an 
international organisation when an act or omission 
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a. is attributable to that organisation under international law; and 
b. constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that organisation. 
 
Thus, where there is a breach of an international obligation and the acts or 
omission is attributable to the UN, the UN may be held responsible for the 
violation. The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (DARIO) are structured the same way as the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States of Internationally Wrongful Acts regarding 
responsibility. Hence, there is a basic distinction between primary rules of 
international law (which create obligations for international organisations) and 
secondary rules (which consider whether there has been a violation of the 
international obligation and its consequences).168 DARIO constitute secondary 
rules. It must therefore first be established which primary rule of international 
law is relevant in the specific case in order to decide whether the responsibility 
of the organisation is entailed. 
 
Article 7 of DARIO concerns the conduct of organs of a State or organs or 
agents of an international organisation placed at the disposal of another 
international organisation. This is the case where national contingents are 
placed at the disposal of a UN peacekeeping operation.169 In these cases, the 
sending State retains disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over the 
individual members of the contingent.170 A problematic issue in this context is 
often that of deciding which conduct is attributable (in accordance with Article 
3 (a)) to whom; in other words, when the conduct of a seconding organ or 
agent is attributable to the receiving organisation (in this context, the UN) and 
when it is attributable to the sending State.171 According Article 7, “[…t]he 
conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international 
organization that is placed at the disposal of another international organization 
shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization if 
the organization exercises effective control over that conduct” (emphasis added). 
Hence, the exercise of effective control is decisive when establishing whether it 
is the sending State or the organisation as such to which the act or omission in 
question should be attributed.   
 
According to the commentary to DARIO, UN practice relating to 
peacekeeping operations is to regard acts of peacekeeping forces as in principle 
imputable to the UN. If such acts violate an international obligation, they entail 
the responsibility of the organisation as such.172 However, the fact that the 
sending State retains jurisdiction in some aspects, such as in criminal and 
disciplinary matters, is of importance for the question of attribution since the 
State may retain control over its military contingent in those aspects.173 
Generally, the UN claims exclusive command and control over the 
peacekeeping forces for the sake of military efficiency. However, attribution of 
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conduct should, according to the commentary, be based on a “factual 
criterion”.174 
 
DARIO have been referred to, inter alia, by the ECtHR in Al-Jedda v. the United 
Kingdom.175 The Draft Articles were also of importance for the ECtHR’s 
reasoning regarding attribution and the outcome in Behrami and Saramati, which 
is dealt with in more detail below, where the ECtHR explicitly referred to them 
and particularly to the effective control criterion.176 In the latter case, the ECtHR 
based parts of its reasoning regarding attribution on DARIO.177  
 
Human rights treaties, including the ECHR, require that an act or omission is 
attributable to the State in order for responsibility to arise.178 The concept of 
attribution is separate from that of jurisdiction. The two notions and the 
interrelationship between them has not been handled consistently by the 
ECtHR; in some cases (such as Al-Jedda, referred to in the following), 
attribution of conduct to the State has been established first and thereafter the 
issue of whether extraterritorial jurisdiction was exercised has been examined. 
In other cases, the exercise of jurisdiction by the State over a territory has been 
considered to imply in itself that the acts of the authorities in that area were 
attributable to the State.179 The question of attribution is of importance for the 
purpose of this essay. As is shown below, the fact that the acts and omissions 
of KFOR and UNMIK were attributable to the UN prevented them from 
being subjected to the scrutiny of the ECtHR in the case of Behrami and 
Saramati, which is described in detail below. In the Al-Jedda case180, on the other 
hand, where the conduct of British troops was attributable to the United 
Kingdom rather than to the UN, the ECtHR was able to proceed to examine 
the merits of the case. Thus, in order to be able to bring a claim against the 
sending State, the conduct must be attributable to that State. 
 
The Behrami and Saramati case concerned the situation in Kosovo. In 1999 the 
UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244181, acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. The resolution established a dual international presence in 
Kosovo; a civil interim administration run by the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (known as UNMIK), and the NATO-led military forces (known as 
KFOR).182 UNMIK consisted of national contingents placed at the disposal of 
the UN, and constituted a subsidiary organ to the UN.183 KFOR, the NATO-
led peacekeeping force, was sub-divided into a number of multinational 
brigades184 but deployed under “unified command and control”.185 KFOR did 
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not constitute a subsidiary organ to the UN.186 The ECtHR’s admissibility 
decision in the joint cases revolved around alleged human rights violations in 
Kosovo by UNMIK and KFOR forces. 
 
In the Behrami case, the applicants were Mr Agim Behrami and his son Bekir 
Behrami. The other son had been killed and Bekir had been severely injured 
while playing with undetonated cluster bomb units dropped by NATO during 
the bombardment in 1999.187 The area where the incident took place was under 
the responsibility of the KFOR multinational brigade led by France. The 
applicants submitted a case against France alleging that the incident leading to 
the death and injuries took place because of the failure of French KFOR 
troops to mark or defuse the undetonated cluster bomb units, in accordance 
with the Security Council resolution. Therefore, allegedly, the rights of the 
applicants under Article 2 of the ECHR had been violated.188 Supervising de-
mining lied within KFOR’s mandate until the international civil presence (i.e. 
UNMIK) could, as appropriate, take over responsibility for that task.189 
 
Mr Saramati had been arrested and detained by UNMIK police, suspected of 
murder and illegal possession of a weapon, and later re-arrested in the sector 
assigned to the multinational brigade led by Germany and on the order of a 
Norwegian Commander of KFOR, subsequently replaced by a French 
officer.190 It was argued that KFOR’s mandate under the Security Council 
resolution included the authority to detain, as that was considered necessary in 
order “to maintain a safe and secure environment”.191 The detention of Mr 
Saramati was extended three times and he argued that his rights under Articles 
5, 13 and 6 § 1 of the ECHR had been violated.192   
 
The applicants argued that there was a sufficient jurisdictional link between 
them and the respondent States, within the meaning of Article 1, while the 
respondent States maintained that the applicants did not fall within their 
jurisdiction.193 At the outset, the ECtHR established that Kosovo was at the 
time under the effective control of the international presences, which exercised 
the public powers normally exercised by the FRY Government.194 The ECtHR 
avoided the question of whether the responding States exercised extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 1 of the ECHR in Kosovo. Instead, it 
was found more relevant to examine whether the ECtHR was competent to 
“[…] examine under the Convention those States’ contribution to the civil and 
security presences which did exercise the relevant control of Kosovo” and the 
compatibility ratione personae of the complaints with the Convention.195  
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Subsequently, the ECtHR reviewed whether the impugned action or inaction 
could be attributed to the UN. In this connection it was noted that the Security 
Council resolution had delegated powers to both KFOR and UNMIK, and a 
key question was therefore whether the Security Council retained “ultimate 
authority and control” over the security mission.196 Several factors indicated 
that the powers had been lawfully delegated to KFOR and UNMIK and that 
therefore the Security Council had retained such control as was necessary for 
the action and inaction to be attributable to the UN in both cases.197 After this, 
it was examined whether the ECtHR was competent ratione personae to review 
action or inaction attributable to the UN. In relation to this, the ECtHR simply 
found that the ECHR cannot be interpreted “[…] in a manner which would 
subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered by 
UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to the 
scrutiny of the Court”198, and declared both applications inadmissible as they 
were incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.199 
 
It can be noted that the decision has been referred to by the ECtHR when 
declaring subsequent applications inadmissible. For example, since KFOR 
actions were “[…] in principle attributable to the UN, which had a legal 
personality separate from that of its member States and which was not a 
Contracting Party to the Convention”, and because the ECtHR “[…] was not 
competent ratione personae to review the acts of the respondent States carried 
out on behalf of the UN”, the applications in Kasumaj v. Greece and Gajic v. 
Germany were declared inadmissible.200 
 
In Al-Jedda, the applicant was detained in a British-run military facility in Basra, 
Iraq, and the case concerned an alleged violation of Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR. 
The detention, which lasted for over three years, took place during the 
occupation of Iraq by the Coalition States. The merits of the case concerned 
the relationship and potential norm conflict between Security Council 
resolution 1546 and Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR, i.e. similar to the issue 
described in chapter 2.1.2. 
 
The admissibility issue, which is in focus here, concerned whether the 
internment of Mr Al-Jedda was attributable to the United Kingdom or to the 
UN, and whether he fell within the jurisdiction of the UK. In this respect, the 
ECtHR found that firstly, the UN’s role regarding security in Iraq in 2004 was 
different from that in Kosovo in 1999, where the detention of Mr Saramati had 
been considered attributable to the UN rather than to any of the troop-
contributing nations.201 In Kosovo, the international security forces’ presence 
had been established by a Security Council resolution in the first place. Iraq, on 
the other hand, had been invaded by the United States-led coalition, before any 
Security Council resolutions were adopted on the matter. Further, the 
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detention of Mr Al-Jedda took place within a facility exclusively controlled by 
United Kingdom forces. Another circumstance of importance in this case was 
that the UN (through the Secretary-General and the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), both organs of the UN) had repeatedly protested 
against the extent to which security internment was being used by the 
multinational force. This made it difficult to regard the detention as 
attributable to the UN.202  
 
Overall, the ECtHR concluded that the UN Security Council had “neither 
effective control nor ultimate authority and control” over the acts and 
omissions of troops constituting the Multinational Force. The ECtHR did not 
consider that the acts of Multinational Force soldiers became attributable to 
the UN or ceased to be attributable to the troop-contributing nations.203 The 
detention of Mr Al-Jedda was therefore not attributable to the UN, but to the 
United Kingdom.204 During his internment, the applicant fell within the 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom since the internment took place within a 
detention facility controlled exclusively by British forces and the applicant was 
within the control and authority of the UK throughout.205  This is in 
accordance with the State agent authority and control model established by the 
ECtHR in Al-Skeini, and resembles the personal model of jurisdiction referred 
to in chapter 3.2.2. As the conduct was attributable to the UK and the 
applicant fell within the jurisdiction of the UK, the ECtHR could proceed to 
examine the merits of the case. 
3.4.1 Reflections on attribution – a tricky question in 
the context of UN peacekeeping 
In the context of international peacekeeping missions, the question of 
attribution is a crucial and tricky one. According to for example Aurel Sari at 
the University of Exeter, military members of national contingents 
participating in international peacekeeping operations occupy a “dual legal 
position” and act in a “dual role”; it acts in an international capacity as part of 
the structure of the international organisation carrying out the mission, while in 
a national capacity as it simultaneously constitutes a national organ of the 
sending State.206 The fact that the international presences exercise effective 
control over an area does not exclude the possibility that the troops 
contributed by States can act in a national capacity and thereby bring 
individuals within the jurisdiction of the sending State. The decisive question 
for deciding in what capacity someone is acting, Sari argues, is in whose name 
and for whom, from a functional point of view, the person is acting.207 It can 
further be argued that the same conduct may be attributable to an international 
organisation and the State simultaneously.208  
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As opposed to the decision in Behrami and Saramati, where the impugned 
actions and omissions were considered attributable to the UN, in Al-Jedda, the 
ECtHR found that the detention was attributable to the UK and subsequently 
went on to examine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction arose and later the 
merits of the alleged violations. Hence, attributing actions and omissions of the 
peacekeeping soldiers to the sending State is of crucial importance for victims 
of human rights violations to be able to bring a claim against a Contracting 
State because it seems like the ECtHR lacks jurisdiction over acts or omissions 
which are attributable to the UN.209 As some observers put it, after the Al-Jedda 
judgment, the “door is open” for Contracting States to avoid jurisdictional 
liability for human rights violations either attributable to the UN or required by 
a UN resolution.210 Where an act or omission is attributable to the UN and not 
to the sending State, DARIO provide some guidance as to the responsibility of 
the UN. However, the responsibility of the organisation is not further 
examined in this essay as its main focus is the responsibility of sending States. 
In chapter 4.3.1.1, it is argued that certain conduct by peacekeepers cannot be 
attributed to the UN and thus that the sending States which are parties to the 
ECHR could be held accountable under the ECHR. Thereafter, the question 
whether the ECHR could serve as a satisfactory legal framework in these 
situations is addressed.  
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4 Analysis: Possible application of 
human rights treaties in UN 
peacekeeping operations 
4.1 Application of the ICCPR in UN 
peacekeeping operations?  
As outlined above (chapter 3.3.2), the ICCPR may apply extraterritorially 
where forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party in a 
peacekeeping operation exercise power or effective control over an 
individual.211 However, the case law of the HRC is not as extensive as that of 
the ECtHR regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction. The HRC has stated that the 
applicability of international humanitarian law does not preclude accountability 
of States parties in accordance with Article 2.1 of the ICCPR for extraterritorial 
actions of its agents, and one State party has been encouraged to provide 
training on relevant rights contained in the ICCPR specifically designed for 
members of its security forces deployed internationally.212 The scope of the 
notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of the ICCPR and in what 
situations jurisdiction is exercised in the context of peacekeeping operations 
remains unclear.213 It remains unclear, for example, what degree of control is 
required over a territory as well as over an individual in order for a State to be 
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in the meaning of the ICCPR.  
 
The complaints procedure under the ICCPR was established through its first 
Optional Protocol. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol states that States parties 
recognise the competence of the HRC to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
ICCPR. To date, the Optional Protocol has 115 States Parties.214  Among the 
ten largest troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations (see 
chapter 2.3), only three have ratified the Optional Protocol and the individual 
complaints mechanism contained therein.215 
 
Hence, there is a possibility that the ICCPR would apply to acts committed 
extraterritorially by UN peacekeepers and that such acts would thus entail the 
exercise of jurisdiction of the sending State. However, as explained initially, 
this essay focuses mainly on the ECHR for several reasons; it could be argued 
that the ECHR provides the best possibilities of addressing impunity because, 
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inter alia, the judgments of the ECtHR are legally binding and its case law is 
more developed in terms of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
4.2 Application of the ECHR in UN 
peacekeeping operations? 
In the case law of the ECtHR, which is more extensive than that of the HRC 
in this aspect, there are a number of cases regarding alleged human rights 
violations in situations involving UN Security Council resolutions. The 
situation in Behrami and Saramati, described in chapter 3.4, concerned a UN 
Security Council mandated operation in Kosovo. This chapter seeks to discuss 
and analyse how the ECtHR has handled the application of the ECHR in the 
context of UN peacekeeping operation and subsequently, the case law is 
analysed and to some extent criticised. A de lege ferenda reasoning is carried out, 
mainly in chapter 4.3, arguing for a different approach to the example relating 
to the Central African Republic. 
4.2.1 Reflections – does the case law of the ECtHR 
exclude the possibility of legal review of acts in 
the course of UN peacekeeping? 
At the outset, it should be noted that the cases concerning military operations 
abroad dealt with by the ECtHR are very fact-specific and the outcome may 
differ significantly depending on, inter alia, the situation on the ground, the 
terms of the Security Council resolution in question, the different status-of-
forces agreements, and one should be cautious when drawing too general 
conclusions. However, a few remarks can be made in relation to this chapter. 
 
This section relates to the first research question of this essay, regarding the 
possibility of State accountability to arise for human rights violations 
committed by its soldiers during UN peacekeeping operations. The ECtHR 
stated in its admissibility decision in Behrami and Saramati that acts and 
omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered by UNSC resolutions and 
occur prior to or in the course of such missions cannot be reviewed by the 
ECtHR, because the operations are fundamental to the UN's mission to secure 
international peace and security and they rely on the support from the Member 
States.216 This decision was problematic in the sense that the ECtHR 
unconditionally rejected the possibility of reviewing the legality of the acts and 
omissions carried out by KFOR and UNMIK and attributable to the UN, or of 
any action by a Contracting State where authority for the action lies with the 
UN.217 For this reason, the decision probably has considerable consequences 
for human rights protection in peacekeeping operations, as it possibly removes 
a variety of State conduct from its sphere of review.218 This effect of the 
decision in Behrami and Saramati is illustrated by subsequent admissibility 
decisions by the ECtHR such as Kasumaj v. Greece and Gajic v. Germany, where 
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Behrami and Saramati was used by the ECtHR to declare inadmissible claims 
against Contracting States for alleged human rights violations in Kosovo.219 
The outcome can be compared to that of the Al-Jedda case (chapter 3.4), where 
acts by British troops in Iraq were found attributable to the United Kingdom 
and hence could be subject to the scrutiny of the ECtHR, applying the 
principles regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction. Attributing acts or omissions 
to the contracting State thus seems crucial for the individual to be able to bring 
a legal claim against that State. 
 
In my opinion, the problem is that the statement of the ECtHR in Behrami and 
Saramati is too general as it seems to exclude any acts and omissions committed 
by State agents covered by UN Security Council resolution. It would have been 
more understandable if the ECtHR would have pronounced that it could not 
review the legality of UN Security Council resolutions as such, but that it 
would have been possible to review the actual conduct by Contracting States.220 
A regional court such as the ECtHR might not legitimately be able to review 
the legality of decisions made by United Nations organs. However, the 
pronouncement by the ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati excludes the possibility 
for victims of human rights violations to bring a claim before the ECtHR 
where the acts or omissions are covered by UN Security Council resolutions 
and occur in the course of a peacekeeping mission.  This somewhat static 
approach by the ECtHR has been criticised as the ECtHR seemed to abandon 
its “dynamic and evolutionary” approach to human rights protection and 
because the decision upholds a vacuum in accountability for human rights 
violations that occur in carrying out UN Security Council mandates.221 
Upholding such vacuum in accountability for human rights violations is 
questionable from the point of view that human rights are universal, which is 
the theoretical starting point for the purpose of this essay. The approach of the 
ECtHR is rather surprising and perhaps disappointing to human rights 
idealists, coming from a court that has often been progressive and seeking to 
expand the human rights protection. The way the ECtHR expressed it, it 
seems like no acts covered by a UN Security Council resolution may be subject 
to its scrutiny. However, not all acts carried out by UN peacekeepers can be 
attributed to the UN but may very well be carried out in a national capacity or 
outside of the scope of the mandate. In these cases, the ECtHR should, in my 
opinion, be able to review the acts and establish whether extraterritorial 
jurisdiction was exercised, and if so, whether there was a material breach of the 
ECHR.  
 
Some observers have suggested that the rationale behind the unwillingness of 
the ECtHR to adjudicate upon the situation in Behrami and Saramati was the 
“desire to avoid an open conflict with the Security Council”222 and its 
“reluctance to decide on questions of State jurisdiction and norm conflict”223. 
In contrast to the judgment of the ECJ in Kadi (see chapter 2.1.2), where the 
ECJ took a pluralist approach and stated that EU law formed a “distinct, 
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internal legal order”, separating the EU system from the UN system, the 
ECtHR took a more constitutionalist approach to the international legal 
order.224 In doing so, the ECtHR seemed to perceive itself as a specialised 
human rights institution, part of the international legal order where the UN is 
the forum for international cooperation in security matters and whose acts the 
ECtHR is not competent to review.225 The judgment of the ECJ in Kadi, 
however, shows that the perception of the ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati is 
not uncontradicted. It displays that regional treaties can be perceived as distinct 
legal orders and not merely subordinate to the UN system, at least where 
fundamental rights are concerned.  
 
After the ECtHR had delivered its decision in Behrami and Saramati, many 
observers were pessimistic as to the future protection of human rights in this 
context. It has been argued, inter alia, that the decision indicated that the 
significance of the extraterritorial effect of the ECHR was reduced for many 
Contracting States, and that a possible consequence was that participation in 
international peace operations was now removed from the list of practical 
scenarios for extraterritorial effect because the reasoning of the ECtHR 
regarding attribution made it difficult to see how conduct in the course of UN 
peacekeeping operations could be attributed to troop contributing nations.226 
In my opinion, however, this might be true for acts committed in pursuit of 
the mandate, or in the official capacity of peacekeepers. Acts outside of the 
scope of the mandate must be able to be subject to the scrutiny of the ECtHR. 
  
This chapter has aimed to summarise and problematise some aspects of the 
case law of the ECtHR regarding UN peacekeeping operations. However, it is 
argued in the following that the development in the case law of the ECtHR in 
recent years might open up for the possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
arise also in the course of UN peacekeeping. After Behrami and Saramati, the 
ECtHR has dealt with several cases regarding the extraterritorial application of 
the ECHR, some of which have been described in chapter 3.3.3. As outlined in 
that chapter, those cases did not concern the situation of human rights 
violations in UN peacekeeping operations, but rather human rights violations 
by members of the Coalition Forces in Iraq. However, as outlined in the 
relevant chapters above, there were UN Security Council resolutions involved 
in the situation in Iraq, where the Al-Jedda, Al-Skeini and Jaloud cases took 
place, as well. In the following, it is argued that the model of jurisdiction as 
control over an individual, as used in Jaloud, may enable for an individual to 
bring a claim before the ECtHR against a troop-contributing nation. 
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4.3 The example: extraterritorial application of 
the ECHR to the alleged human rights 
violations by MINUSCA personnel – a 
possible solution? 
For the purpose of this essay, the main focus is on the possibility of the ECHR 
to serve as a workable legal venue for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse 
in the Central African Republic. The ICCPR and the complaints mechanism in 
its Optional Protocol have been examined to some extent above. However, it 
can be argued that the ECHR provides the best opportunities for this, mainly 
because of its relatively well-developed case law on extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and the fact that the judgments of the ECtHR are legally binding.  
4.3.1 The relevant rights under the ECHR 
In the Central African Republic, UN peacekeeping troops forming part of 
MINUSCA from, inter alia, France, have allegedly abused children sexually in 
exchange for food and money. For an individual to be able to successfully 
bring a claim against the troop-contributing nation under the ECHR, the act or 
omission must, firstly, fall within the jurisdiction of that State. Secondly, it can 
be examined whether there has been a violation of one or more of the rights or 
freedoms in the ECHR. It is argued here that the most relevant right in this 
case would be Article 3 of the ECHR. This essay focuses on the possibilities of 
bringing a claim against the troop-contributing nation offered by the ECHR, 
rather than the substantive rights contained therein. The ECHR offers the 
most extensive case law both in terms of extraterritorial jurisdiction and in 
terms of the scope of the Article on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
 
According to the well-established case law of the ECtHR, allegations of rape 
and sexual abuse is dealt with under Article 3 and sometimes Article 8 of the 
Convention and rape amounts to treatment contrary to Article 3.227 Under 
Article 3, Contracting States are under a positive obligation to punish rape and 
to effectively investigate rape cases.228 Further, Contracting States have a 
primary duty to secure the right not to be exposed to treatment contrary to 
Articles 3 and 8, or to attacks on one’s personal integrity, by putting in place an 
appropriate legal and administrative framework to deter the commission of 
offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions.229 
Consequently, Contracting States are under a negative obligation not to, 
through its agents, subject individuals within its jurisdiction to treatment 
contrary to, in this case, Article 3, but also under a positive obligation to 
conduct an effective investigation of allegations of rape or other treatment 
contrary to Article 3.  
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Soldiers are likely to be considered as State agents or organs of the State and it 
should therefore not be difficult to view the rape as attributable (in the 
meaning of the ECHR) to the sending State. Should the soldiers for some 
reason not be considered as State agents, but acting in a personal capacity, the 
State is still under the positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation. 
The requirements on this investigation are similar where the treatment contrary 
to Article 3 has been inflicted by private individuals.230 Although it is possible 
that violations of other Articles of the ECHR have taken place in the Central 
African Republic, or that not all acts of sexual exploitation and abuse amount 
to violations of Article 3, the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment as laid down in Article 3 is in focus for the 
purpose of this essay. However, the question whether a certain conduct 
amounts to a material violation of Article 3 or not is not dealt with. The focus 
of this chapter is the extraterritorial application of the ECHR, and in the case 
of the Central African Republic example, Article 3 is the relevant substantial 
Article.  
4.3.1.1 The conduct is attributable to the sending State 
Following what has been outlined above (chapter 3.4), it seems that where a 
conduct is attributable to the UN, the ECtHR cannot review such conduct. 
While the ECtHR’s conclusion in its decision in Behrami and Saramati may be 
criticised for enabling Contracting States to avoid jurisdictional liability 
regarding conduct attributable to the UN or required by a resolution, it is 
argued here that the conduct in question in the Central African Republic 
situation cannot be attributable to the UN. The situation and the conduct in 
question in Al-Jedda (detention) as well as that in Behrami and Saramati 
(detention and failure to de-mine) are different from that in the Central African 
Republic.  
 
While the conduct constituting the alleged human rights violations in Al-Jedda 
and Behrami and Saramati could be lawful in the context of a peacekeeping 
operation, the behaviour of the French soldiers in the Central African Republic 
cannot be said to be “covered” (see Behrami and Saramati, para. 149) or required 
by a UN resolution under any circumstances. It is not exactly clear what the 
ECtHR intended in Behrami and Saramati when pronouncing that it could not 
review acts “covered” by Security Council resolutions. It could be either that 
all acts committed by UN peacekeepers, regardless of their nature, are covered 
by the resolution, or merely acts that are evidently committed in pursuit of the 
mandate. For the purpose of this essay, it is argued that acts committed outside 
of the scope of the mandate of the operation is performed in a national 
capacity, i.e. it is presumed that not all acts committed by UN peacekeepers are 
“covered” by the resolution in question. The UN considers itself responsible 
for actions of peacekeepers when on duty, while it has stated that it does not 
consider itself responsible for acts committed by peacekeepers off duty. In this 
respect, “off duty” means not operating in an official capacity. According to 
such a definition, it could be argued that the UN would never be accountable 
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for acts of sexual exploitation and abuse as such acts cannot per se be included 
in the official duties of peacekeepers.231 
 
In its third-party submission in Behrami and Saramati, the United Kingdom 
argued that Article 1 of the ECHR “[…] should be interpreted to mean that, 
where officials from States act together within the scope of an international operation 
authorised by the UN, they are not exercising sovereign jurisdiction but that of 
the international authority, so that their acts did not bring those affected within 
the jurisdiction of the States or engage the Convention responsibilities of those 
States” (emphasis added).232 A contrario, such reasoning would imply that acts 
committed outside the scope of an international operation authorised by the 
UN, i.e. outside the mandate, or outside of the chain of command, would be 
committed in a national capacity.233 As outlined above (chapter 3.4.1), the fact 
that the international presences exercise effective control over an area does not 
exclude the possibility that the troops contributed by States can act in a 
national capacity. The decisive question for deciding in what capacity someone 
is acting is in whose name and for whom, from a functional point of view, the 
person is acting.234 Acts performed in a national capacity can create a 
jurisdictional link that can bring the individual concerned within the 
jurisdiction of the sending State for the purposes of Article 1.235 In the context 
of sexual abuse in the Central African Republic, the conduct of the French 
troops cannot be attributable to the UN because sexual exploitation or abuse 
of civilians is never a necessary mean to carrying out a mandate. Instead, the 
conduct of the French soldiers is attributable the sending State and therefore it 
would be relevant to proceed to examine the issue of jurisdiction. Conduct 
attributable to a Contracting State can be subject to the scrutiny of the ECtHR. 
The issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction therefore remains central.  
4.3.1.2 The ”State agent authority and control” principle or 
the personal model of jurisdiction – a possible 
solution? 
According to the way of reasoning used by the ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati 
and Al-Jedda, after concluding that the conduct is attributable to the troop-
contributing nation rather than to the UN, the next step would be to examine 
the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In that respect, recalling the case law of 
the ECtHR regarding the cases in Iraq (see chapter 3.3.3.1) is useful. The 
personal model of jurisdiction (chapter 3.3.2) or the State agent authority and 
control principle could in the case of sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic enable a victim to bring a claim 
before the ECtHR. As has been shown above, the ECtHR has in its recent 
case law on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction accepted an increasing 
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number of exceptions to what used to be the general rule; that jurisdiction is 
“primarily territorial”.  
 
In particular, the judgment in Jaloud may open up for a significantly more 
generous application of the ECHR extraterritorially, enabling for the personal 
model of jurisdiction to apply not only where a person is taken into detention, 
but also where control is exercised over person passing through a checkpoint. 
An important aspect in Jaloud was that even though the Dutch troops were 
under the operational command of a British commander, the Netherlands 
retained “full command” over its military personnel. The fact that they were 
executing an order given by an authority of a foreign State was not in itself 
sufficient to relieve the Netherlands of their obligations under the ECHR, nor 
did it divest the Netherlands of its jurisdiction in the meaning of Article 1.236 
Some observers perceive the way the ECtHR established jurisdiction in Jaloud 
as a new version of personal jurisdiction, in addition to that which arises, for 
example, where a State holds an individual in arrest or detention.237 
Consequently, a State may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over individuals 
passing through a vehicle checkpoint controlled by that State. However, in 
contrast to for example a detention facility, vehicle checkpoints are not fixed to 
a building or similar and can be moved with short notice. Therefore, it can be 
questioned what the exact difference is between a checkpoint and for example 
foot patrol. Is it possible that the ECHR will apply also to foot patrol in the 
future?238 It seems like Jaloud is a step towards opening up for the application 
of the ECHR in armed conflicts abroad more frequently. As an idealist and not 
a military commander, I am of the opinion that steps towards granting 
universality of human rights are positive. Further, on a moral level, an 
increased applicability of human rights in armed conflict is positive. Such 
approach would be consistent with the idea of universality of human rights and 
is appealing to an idealistic human rights law student as myself. It makes sense 
that a State which, through the ratification of a human rights convention, 
undertakes to respect, protect and fulfil human rights239 of individuals would 
be, or at least should be, willing to do so regardless of where in the world and 
under what circumstances it operates. 
 
In my opinion, a similar reasoning to that applied by the ECtHR in Jaloud 
could, depending on the circumstances of the specific case, lead to the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR in the context of UN peacekeeping 
operations in the future. Mr Jaloud met his death while passing through a 
checkpoint set up in the execution of SFIR’s mission under UN Security 
Council resolution 1483. The ECtHR established that the Netherlands 
exercised jurisdiction within the limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose 
of asserting authority and control over persons passing through the 
checkpoint.240 If a State can exercise authority and control and thus 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction in accordance with Article 1 of the ECHR over 
persons passing through a vehicle checkpoint set up in accordance with a 
Security Council resolution, it is imaginable that the same may apply to several 
other situations. Likewise, where abuse takes place for example in facilities 
provided in order to fulfil the mandate of a peacekeeping operation, it could be 
argued that the victim is within the jurisdiction of the sending State.  
 
Firstly, if some of the cases of abuse took place within facilities established for 
the purpose of fulfilling the mandate, it is plausible that the individuals were 
within the jurisdiction of the sending State based on the “State agent authority 
and control” principle. As outlined above (see chapter 3.3.3.1), according to 
the ECtHR, what is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and 
control over the person in question.241 Given the judgment in Jaloud, I am of 
the opinion that such a conclusion does not seem like too much of a long shot 
as it would have done just a few years ago, before Jaloud. If a State can exercise 
jurisdiction over a person passing through a checkpoint, it seems reasonable to 
me that where a soldier of the sending State (i.e. a State agent) commits a crime 
against a civilian, the victim may be brought within the jurisdiction of the 
sending State under the same premises. Some have argued that the exercise of 
jurisdiction over individuals is not limited to situations where the individual is 
detained in a permanent detention facility. Rather, the individual may be under 
the authority and control of the State through the exercise of any form of 
physical control. That may be when he or she is held back by State agents in a 
room, a vehicle, or being physically controlled by State agents outdoors.242 If 
jurisdiction arises in such a case, the State would be under the obligation to 
secure to that individual the rights and freedoms of the ECHR relevant to his 
or her situation.  
 
The case law of the ECtHR regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, with Jaloud as 
the most recent addition, has been subject to criticism for being inconsistent 
and hard to foresee (see chapter 3.3.3.2, comments by, inter alia, judge Bonello). 
In order to make the law more foreseeable, I believe that there is a need for 
more elaborated general principles on jurisdiction to be established, and most 
of all for those principles to be applied consistently by the ECtHR. The 
question is how such general principles could be framed. Starting with the 
spatial model (chapter 3.2.1), it seems obvious that applying only that model 
and doing so too strictly would not guarantee the rights and freedoms of the 
ECHR in a way that most people probably intuitively consider that it should. If 
the ECHR would apply only within the territory of the Contracting States, 
States would be free to disregard their human rights obligations elsewhere.  In 
order to provide an effective human rights protection, the spatial model needs 
to, at least to some extent, be supplemented by the personal model of 
jurisdiction (chapter 3.2.2). It seems like the ECtHR is now struggling to 
establish how far the personal model can be elaborated. As has been argued 
above, the latest position of the ECtHR in Jaloud has opened up for a more 
permissive approach to extraterritorial application of the ECHR. However, in 
order for a more consistent case law to be established and in order for States to 
be able to foresee whether the ECHR applies to acts or omissions of their 
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agents, I am inclined to agree with Milanovic in that a “third model” of 
jurisdiction (chapter 3.2.3) could be useful. 
4.3.1.3 The third model of jurisdiction – a possible solution? 
The third model of jurisdiction argued for by Milanovic is, in my opinion, a 
constructive suggestion on how to enable for the individual to bring a claim 
before the ECtHR. This model distinguishes between positive and negative 
obligations. As outlined above, according to that model, a State must always 
comply with its negative obligations, including when acting extraterritorially, 
because States can always control the actions of their organs or agents. 
According to this way of reasoning, victims of sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by French troops in the Central African Republic would be able to 
bring a legal claim against France before the ECtHR, regardless of whether 
France controlled the area or the individual, because States have a negative 
obligation not to subject individuals to treatment that is contrary to Article 3 of 
the ECHR through its agents. On the other hand, according to this model, 
sending States would not be able to be held accountable for violations of their 
positive obligations, such as the obligation to effectively investigate allegations 
of rape, extraterritorially. However, this model seems to be able to reconcile 
the need for a better human rights protection when States act extraterritorially 
with the upsides of keeping the threshold character of Article 1 of the ECHR. 
It also offers a reasonable and acceptable solution to the situation in focus of 
this study, where the common sense says that the sending State must be held 
accountable for the actions of their soldiers, but where it might be difficult to 
prove the existence of the jurisdictional link that is required.  
 
Against the background of the idea of universality of human rights, it can be 
questioned why States are not always obliged to comply with all of their human 
rights obligations, at all times and in all places. However, there is little support 
for this in the ECHR since such a view is not what States have agreed upon at 
ratification, as Article 1 speaks of “[…] everyone within their jurisdiction”. 
Likewise, according to Article 2.1 of the ICCPR, “[e]ach State Party […] 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant […]”. 
It can also be argued that such an interpretation would place an unrealistic 
burden on States, implying that they would have to not only respect but also to 
ensure human rights to everyone, everywhere. Therefore, I am of the opinion 
that Milanovic’ suggested “third model” and the separation between positive 
and negative obligations in terms of extraterritorial jurisdiction is feasible. The 
third model seems to be able to, at least in theory, reconcile the idea of 
universality of human rights and effectiveness by imposing on States an 
obligation to comply with their negative human rights obligations everywhere 
(i.e. universality of human rights), while having to fulfil their positive human 
rights obligations only where they possess control over territory (i.e. 
effectiveness and feasibility).243 The main drawback of the third model, 
however, is that there does not seem to be much legal support for the division 
between positive and negative obligations in this regard. Milanovic is also 
                                                
243 See Milanovic (2013), p. 219. 
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aware of some problematic aspects of the model he is advocating for.244 On the 
other hand, the ECtHR has previously not been afraid of developing its case 
law in new ways. It might be the case that the ECtHR through its judgment in 
Jaloud opened up for the possibility of taking up its “dynamic and evolutionary 
approach” (see chapter 4.2.1). 
4.4 Reflections – ECHR: a possible regional 
solution, but globally insufficient 
In Jaloud, the Netherlands troops participated in the Stabilization Force in Iraq 
and were under the command of a United Kingdom officer. The basis for 
sending Netherlands troops to Iraq was to be found in Security Council 
resolution 1483. The role of the Netherlands in this operation was not as 
prominent as that of the US or the UK, who were present in Iraq in the 
capacity of occupying powers. Nevertheless, the Netherlands did exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicant, according to the ECtHR. It 
could be argued that the role of the countries contributing to the SFIR was 
similar to that of troop contributing countries in UN peacekeeping missions. 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that if the ECtHR in the future would step 
away from its (in my opinion too general) statement in Behrami and Saramati 
that it cannot review acts covered by Security Council resolutions or at least 
opening up for the possibility that some acts committed in the course of a UN 
peacekeeping operation may be attributable not to the UN but to the troop-
contributing State, chances are that it would come to a similar conclusion as in 
Jaloud. If so, extraterritorial jurisdiction could arise in the context of UN 
peacekeeping operations, and Contracting States could be held accountable for 
human rights violations committed by military members of its national 
contingents. Would that be the case, it could further be argued that, 
considering the case law of the ECtHR on the scope of Article 3 and Article 8, 
Contracting States are under an obligation to conduct an effective investigation 
into allegations (similarly to in Jaloud, where the merits concerned the 
obligation to conduct an effective investigation under Article 2). In this aspect, 
one could hope that the Jaloud case opens up for the possibility of the ECtHR 
to continue its “dynamic and evolutionary approach” (see reasoning by de 
Búrca referred to in chapter 4.2.1).  
 
An important aspect that should be mentioned in this context is that of the 
potentially deterring effect of a permissive interpretation of the notion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. If the requirements of human rights compliance are 
too strict (or even if there is insecurity as to whether the ECHR applies or not), 
States may be deterred from contributing to peacekeeping operations. As 
argued by Norway in Behrami and Saramati, extending Article 1 of the ECHR to 
cover peacekeeping operations risked “[…] deterring States from participating 
in such missions and […] making already complex peacekeeping operations 
                                                
244 Ibid., p. 211, where it is stated that “[a]dopting the third model would require a radical 
rethink of Strasbourg’s approach, and to a lesser extent also that of other human rights bodies. 
I am well aware that this makes the third model less attractive”, and p. 119: “[i]t is, however, 
not free of all weaknesses, and is lacking in explicit textual support at least with regard to some 
treaties”. 
 56 
unworkable due to overlapping and perhaps conflicting national or regional 
standards”.245 It was also argued by Norway and France that recognising 
jurisdiction of troop-contributing nations would undermine the coherence and 
effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.246  
 
In conclusion, I see two options of evolving ECtHR case law so as to afford a 
satisfactory human rights protection for individuals in these cases. The first 
option is that the ECtHR would resume its “dynamic and evolutionary” 
approach and adopt a similar approach as in Jaloud and establish that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of the ECHR can be exercised also in the 
context of UN peacekeeping under certain circumstances. The second option 
would be to adopt the “third model” of jurisdiction suggested by Milanovic. A 
profound human rights protection would then (at least in theory) be afforded 
to victims of sexual abuse also in the context of UN peacekeeping operations 
in countries outside of Europe. However, this would not be satisfactory from a 
human rights perspective, as the possibilities of bringing a legal claim and 
holding the perpetrator accountable would depend on where the perpetrator is 
from. In some cases, the troop-contributing nation in question does not 
recognise the occurrence of, for instance, sexual exploitation and abuse by 
their troops and many of the major troop-contributing nations are non-
European (i.e. the ECHR would be irrelevant) and have not ratified the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and thus not recognised the individual 
complaints mechanism contained therein.  
 
This essay has certain delimitations and is for example is very Europe-centred. 
Other regional mechanisms and instruments fall outside its scope, mainly 
because of limitations in terms of space and time. It is possible that the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR argued for here could serve as a model 
for other regional mechanisms, such as the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights or the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
and their respective human rights instruments, and thus indeed form part of a 
“global solution”. However, the existing regional human rights mechanisms do 
not cover the entire world (for example, there is no regional Asian convention 
for the protection of human rights) and therefore it is argued that a more 
comprehensive, “global” solution is required. This is elaborated upon in 
chapter 5.3. 
                                                
245 Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, para. 90. 
246 Ibid., para. 94. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
5.1 Regionally: the ECHR could serve as a 
legal venue 
As argued for above, there is a possibility that the ECHR could provide a 
sufficient legal basis for successfully bringing a legal claim against a European 
troop-contributing nation, whose soldiers commit human rights violations 
against civilians in the course of UN peacekeeping. It has been argued that 
sexual exploitation and abuse cannot be covered by the mandate of a 
peacekeeping operation and is therefore not attributable to the UN, but to the 
troop-contributing nation. In order for such a claim to be able to be declared 
admissible, the ECtHR must step away from its case law established in Behrami 
and Saramati and subsequently reaffirmed in Kasumaj and Gajic, or at least adopt 
a more nuanced approach, recognising that perhaps not all acts or omissions 
by UN peacekeepers are attributable to the UN.  
 
Where certain acts or omissions are attributable to a Contracting State, the 
question of extraterritorial jurisdiction needs to be examined. This is where the 
recent development of the case law if the ECtHR becomes relevant; in for 
example Al-Skeini, Al-Jedda and Jaloud, all relating to conduct attributable to 
European States in Iraq, the ECtHR has shown an increasingly permissive 
approach to extraterritorial application of the ECHR. In Jaloud, the ECtHR 
stated that the Netherlands had exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction “[…] 
within the limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose of asserting authority 
and control over individuals passing through the checkpoint”247. Likewise, it 
has been argued in this essay that where, for example, sexual abuse takes place 
in a tent or other facilities set up for the purpose of fulfilling the mandate, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction may be exercised according to a permissive 
interpretation of the State agent authority and control exception to the rule that 
jurisdiction is “primarily territorial”. It has also been argued above that an 
individual may be brought within the jurisdiction of a State through the 
exercise of any form of physical control, not necessarily within a detention 
facility but also in a room, in a vehicle or outdoors. Where extraterritorial 
jurisdiction arises, the State must secure to that individual the rights and 
freedoms in the ECHR relevant to the situation of that individual. In terms of 
Article 3 of the ECHR, that includes, in addition to the obligation not to 
subject any individual to treatment contrary to the Article, the positive 
obligation to conduct an effective investigation of well-founded allegations.   
 
Another possible solution that has been argued for in this essay is the model of 
jurisdiction advocated for by Milanovic, as outlined in chapter 3.2.3. Building 
on the separation between positive and negative obligations, it seems to be able 
to reconcile the idea of universality of human rights with the need for 
effectiveness. If this model were applied, Contracting States would, in the 
context of UN peacekeeping operations overseas, be able to be held 
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accountable for violations committed by its agents of the negative obligation 
not to subject anyone to treatment contrary to, inter alia, Article 3, while not 
having to comply with positive obligations. Thus, in the Central African 
Republic example, victims would be able to bring a legal claim against the 
sending (European) State where the soldiers committed acts possibly 
amounting to treatment contrary to for example Article 3.  
5.2 Globally: insufficient possibilities for 
victims to bring a legal claim against troop-
contributing nations 
As has been described in this essay, I am of the opinion that the current legal 
framework does not provide a satisfactory human rights protection where 
civilians are subjected to sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. 
The different possible legal venues are insufficient in different ways.  
 
This essay attempts to display that the ECHR is a human rights treaty that 
could provide prospects of providing the individual victims with a legal venue. 
According to the reasoning presented above (chapter 5.1), the ECHR could be 
interpreted so as to provide a possibility for victims of sexual exploitation and 
abuse in the course of UN peacekeeping operations overseas to bring a legal 
claim against the sending State. However, from the perspective of the victim, 
this is insufficient as the possibility of administering justice thus would depend 
on where the perpetrator is from; in many cases, the perpetrator is not from a 
State Party to the ECHR.    
 
The ICCPR, on the other hand, is almost universal in its scope, with 168 States 
Parties and 7 signatories.248 However, as outlined above, many of the major 
troop-contributing nations have not ratified the Optional Protocol containing 
provisions on the individual complaints mechanism. I am of the opinion that 
the ICCPR and the HRC cannot serve as a sustainable and long-term solution 
as the complaints mechanism currently does not apply to all peacekeepers. 
Thus, the problem is the same as in relation to the ECHR – where there is an 
allegation against peacekeepers from a troop-contributing nation that has not 
ratified the Optional Protocol and where that country does not take action 
domestically to punish or prevent these acts from occurring, the victims are 
left without possibilities to use the ICCPR as a legal venue. In addition, the 
jurisprudence of the HRC is not very elaborated in terms of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and more importantly, the decisions of the HRC are 
recommendations, which are not legally binding.  
 
There are situations where sexual exploitation and abuse occur and the sending 
State to which the alleged perpetrator belongs is not party to the ECHR nor to 
the ICCPR, and perhaps does not even acknowledge the occurrence of sexual 
exploitation and abuse and thus not taking action to combat its occurrence or 
investigate into allegations. Taken together with the fact that the host State 
often lacks a functioning legal system, victims are often unable to seek justice. 
                                                
248 http://indicators.ohchr.org/, acquired 4 October 2015.  
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5.3 The need for a “global solution” 
In order to ensure victims of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN 
peacekeepers a satisfactory human rights protection and access to justice and in 
order to properly address impunity, there is a need for something to be 
changed. Although the ECHR could, if applied in the manner argued for in 
this essay, provide a functioning legal venue in this respect, it would be 
insufficient. As outlined initially, the starting point of this essay is that human 
rights are universal and should be enjoyed equally by all individuals. Thus, it 
would be unacceptable if different human rights standards applied to different 
soldiers, depending on where in the world he or she is from. There is a need 
for a more comprehensive, global framework to address the occurrence of 
sexual exploitation and abuse in the course of UN peacekeeping operations, as 
the UN system apparently has been unable to sufficiently address it despite 
being aware of it and despite taking a number of measures.  
 
Efforts have been made to investigate the possibilities of a legally binding 
convention for the purpose of addressing sexual exploitation and abuse in UN 
peacekeeping operations, but have not proven to be very successful, for 
different reasons. Further, the proposed convention would not apply to 
military members of national contingents, against which most of the allegations 
of sexual exploitation and abuse are directed.249 As I see it, there are (at least) 
two possibilities of ensuring a satisfactory human rights protection of victims, 
that fills its purpose regardless of where the perpetrator is from; either a 
convention covering also military members of national contingents, which 
would deprive States of their exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters in this 
context, or the establishment of a specialised international court or tribunal for 
this purpose. In order to mark the recent fifteenth anniversary of the adoption 
of Security Council resolution 1325, a comprehensive study was carried out 
with regard to the implementation of the resolution and the women, peace and 
security agenda.250 This study emphasised that the feasibility of setting up an 
international tribunal for sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers 
and UN staff in the field should be discussed with all stakeholders.251 
 
As argued for by some already in 1964, the reservation of exclusive jurisdiction 
over military personnel to the sending State has no justification apart from the 
purely political justification that it is only upon this basis that States will 
provide contingents.252 It is not likely that UN Member States would agree to 
either a convention or a court or tribunal to adjudicate in these matters. 
However, the issue of impunity must be addressed. A key question is who or 
what instance may legitimately review conduct directly or indirectly sanctioned 
by the Security Council. In this essay, it has been argued for a more prominent 
role of the ECtHR in this regard. However, in addition to the fact that the 
possibilities for victims of bringing a legal claim would then vary depending on 
where the perpetrator is from and thus in practice different human rights 
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252 Bowett (1964), p. 440; see also Wills (2013), p. 53. 
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standards would apply to different contingents, it could be argued that there is 
a sort of democratic deficit; a regional court might not be the right instance for 
reviewing acts or omissions in the course of UN peacekeeping operations, 
given the universal character of the UN. What is needed is a uniform review 
system, applicable to all troop-contributing nations. This might be unrealistic 
or even a utopia. However, some sort of review mechanism must be 
established, in order to address impunity, in order for the UN not to lose all of 
its credibility, and in order for individuals that have been subjected to human 
rights violations by UN peacekeepers to be able to seek justice and redress.  
 61 
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